Feb 11 1974
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(New page: The Titan IIIE-Centaur proof-flight vehicle (TC-1) , launched by NASA from Eastern Test Range Complex 41 at 9:43 am EDT carrying a Viking spacecraft model and the SPHINX satell...)
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The Titan IIIE-Centaur proof-flight vehicle (TC-1) , launched by NASA from Eastern Test Range Complex 41 at 9:43 am EDT carrying a Viking spacecraft model and the SPHINX satellite, was destroyed after the Centaur engine failed to start. At 8.1 min from launch, after normal separation from the Titan booster, the Centaur main-engine start failed and the vehicle automatically went into the restart sequence. A second attempt to start the engine failed at 9.2 min after liftoff. Since the vehicle had not achieved orbital velocity the Range Safety Officer at the Antigua, West Indies, tracking station transmitted destruction commands and the Centaur was destroyed at 12.5 min after the liftoff. The vehicle fell into the Atlantic Ocean 3530 km downrange. Inflight data indicated that the liquid-oxygen boost pump had failed to operate during both at-tempted engine starts. A committee was formed to investigate the failure and recommend corrective action.
Although the primary objective of demonstrating the capability of the Titan-Centaur launch vehicle was not accomplished, some objectives were fulfilled: demonstration of the capability of the launch facility to support a Titan-Centaur launch, structural integrity of the vehicle, Centaur guidance and control of the Titan, Titan-Centaur separation, and Centaur standard shroud capability.
The Viking Dynamic Simulator had been instrumented to verify flight loads for the two planned 1975 missions to Mars. Remaining attached to the Centaur stage, the VDS was to have flown a typical Viking launch trajectory with a shortened burn to limit the spacecraft to a low earth orbit, to test the guidance system, and estimate injection accuracy.
The SPHINX Space Plasma High Voltage Interaction Experiment spacecraft had been intended for launch into an elliptical orbit to investigate the effect of charged particles in space on high-voltage solar cells, insulators, and conductors.
The launch vehicle combined NASA's versatile high-energy liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen Centaur upper stage with the Air Force-developed Titan HI booster, a two-stage liquid-propellant core rocket augmented by two strap-on solid-fueled rocket motors. It was designed to fill the performance and cost gap between the Atlas-Centaur and the Saturn vehicles and boost NASA'S heaviest unmanned payloads into orbit or interplanetary trajectories. The first of six scheduled operational missions-the U.S. and West German Helios solar probe scheduled for the fall-would be configured to a two-burn mission to obtain data lost on the proof flight.
The Titan-Centaur program was managed by NASA's Office of Space Science. Lewis Research Center was responsible for the Titan-Centaur system. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Organization was responsible for the Titan IIIE booster, including aerospace ground equipment and Launch Complex 41 site activation. Kennedy Space Center directed launch operations at ETR. (NASA MORS, 25 Jan, 24 June 74; NASA Release 74-25; UPI, W Post, 12 Feb 74, A2; Robinson, Today, 13 Feb 74)
A standardized solar-electric propulsion stage (SEPS) that could become part of a space transportation system for payloads in planetary and earth-orbital missions was under study at Marshall Space Flight Center. SEPS, one of several concepts under study, would be able to accept modules such as a docking subsystem for earth-orbital missions or a science pack-age for planetary missions. Another concept, for an attachable SEP module, would provide propulsion only and depend on spacecraft sub-systems for all other functions. SEPS would carry a cluster of six to nine thrusters, fueled by ionized mercury, and two lightweight 27-m solar-array wings to supply 25 kw of power to the thrusters and payloads. It was being designed for use with the space shuttle and space tug, and application of an attachable SEP module to a Mariner spacecraft was being studied. The tug, supplemented by SEPS, would be able to deploy and retrieve a 2500-kg geosynchronous equatorial payload in 100 days, tripling the amount the unaided tug could deliver. After one delivery, the SEPS could continue to operate between the shuttle orbit and intermediate orbits, delivering and retrieving 20 more payloads before the thruster life was used up. (NASA Release 74-38; NASA OMSF, interview)
A vertical-axis windmill was under study at Langley Research Center as a potential source of nonpolluting energy. The windmill, based on a 1927 principle, had two four-meter curved blades attached at the top and bottom to a five-meter vertical shaft, set on a simple gear system, and a generator that converted wind power to electricity. The airfoil-shaped blades rotated in almost any wind and were expected to achieve enough revolutions per minute to provide the energy requirements of a single-family house at an estimated construction and installation cost of $500 to $1000. A much larger windmill project at Lewis Research Center, for the National Science Foundation, was studying large concentrations of windmills for industrial use [see 11 Jan.]. (NASA Release 74-33)
Dr. Harriet G. Jenkins assumed her duties as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Equal Opportunity Programs at NASA Hq. Dr. Jenkins would assist Dr. Dudley G. McConnell, Assistant Administrator for Equal Opportunity Programs, in agency-wide direction of both employee and contractor aspects of NASA equal opportunity programs. She had been an educational consultant for the Response to Educational Needs project of the Anacostia District of Washington, D.C., public schools and had served in the Berkeley, Calif., school system 20 yrs. (NASA Release 74. 40)
Dr. Charles A. Berry, NASA Director of Life Sciences, was quoted as saying in an interview: "From what we know today, there is no medical reason to bar a two-year mission to Mars. . . . We still need more data, but I don't think the medical findings from a six-month or a year-long mission would differ appreciably from the experience with our three Skylab missions." On a two-year mission to Mars (not likely to be considered before the early 1990s) , "we're going to have a hard time keeping people completely busy," leaving astronauts more time to think of their isolation. "That's another problem we'll have to deal with." Meanwhile, all the data indicate "that man is really adapting to the zero-gravity environment of space. He does that in a way that causes some very large fluctuations initially in various body systems" but, "with time, it appears that these fluctuations settle down." (US News, 11 Feb 74, 62-64)
An Aviation Week & Space Technology editorial said the FY 1975 aerospace budget request offered the aerospace industry "its best prospect in a decade." The dollar increases were "significant because they were aimed at alleviating problems caused by a decade of neglect in basic weapon system development and diplomatic euphoria" and recognized that aerospace was an "important sinew of national power and economic strength.' It was the first budget in many years that had no major program cancellations or cuts. The worst cut, $89 million, meant a six-month delay in the first shuttle flight but was accompanied by a written guarantee of future support for full funding of the program. The military budget was well balanced between research, development, and procurement. While the NASA program would not satisfy the space buffs, it was a strong continuing effort supplemented by $500 million in military space activities and the growing communications and applications space activity in other agencies. The aerospace industry must now spend extra effort in delivering the hardware and performance to meet the challenge required by this budget. (Holz, Av Wk, 11 Feb 74, 7)
The TV film "Houston, We Have a Problem" was criticized by former astronaut James A. Lovell, commander of the aborted Apollo 13 moon-landing mission (launched 11 April 1970) , in a letter to the NASA Administrator, Dr. James C. Fletcher. The fictitious film focused on the personal lives of the Mission Control team that brought the crippled Apollo 13 spacecraft back to earth. Lovell said the film was "in poor taste"; the safe return of Apollo 13 was one of NASA'S finest hours and "it is not necessary to resort to soap opera plots to enliven the . . . story." (Carmody, W Post,1 March 74, C7)
Economy moves left Kennedy Space Center dangerously short on fire protection, according to Jack N. Anderson and Les Whitten in a Washington Post article. The Center was being protected between 3:00 pm and 7:00 am by eight on-duty fire fighters, not enough to man the $750 000 worth of fire equipment or fight a conflagration, they said. The 3 237 500-sq-km facility contained 3747 cu m of liquid oxygen, 3028 cu m of liquid hydrogen, and rocket fuel "to stoke .a flash fire." Boeing Co., which held the KSC fire protection contract, planned to lay off 21 firemen and shift others to lower paying jobs. A Boeing spokesman had said no manned missions were planned until 1975 and the base was adequately protected. The Post quoted a NASA spokesman as saying that the cuts were necessary and that additional fire fighting help was only five minutes away. (W Post, 11 Feb 74, B13)
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