Jul 21 1974
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(New page: The leadership of "NASA's other hero," former Administrator James E. Webb, was recalled by Julian Scheer, former NASA. Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, in the Washington Post: T...)
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The leadership of "NASA's other hero," former Administrator James E. Webb, was recalled by Julian Scheer, former NASA. Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, in the Washington Post: The fifth anniversary of the 20 July 1969 Apollo 11 lunar landing would bring toasts to former astronauts Neil A. Armstrong, Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., and Michael Collins and others. But it had been Webb's "incredible leader-ship" which had made the event possible. Webb had "fought the Bureau of the Budget for every nickel" and usually got his way. In Congress, few believed he was not a scientist or engineer. He dazzled them with his knowledge of the technical as well as his management of the vast NASA program structure. "But it was in the internal workings of NASA where his strength lay." He had an uncanny knack for "standing back and looking at the big picture." He never took on a problem without coming up with as many as four options and, for Webb, every option was an opportunity. Abruptly in 1968, Webb resigned. Most of the major Apollo decisions had been made. "Almost shockingly, it was less than a year away from the first manned lunar landing. Had he . . . waited just a while longer, he could have basked in the moment of tremendous glory." (W Post, 21 July 74, C6)
A multibillion dollar competition between the U.S. and France was being waged over which country would produce the new generation of fighter aircraft for the Western European allies, the New York Times reported. To the victor would go one of the largest aircraft export sales in history, the possibility of producing 2006 or more aircraft worth between $10 billion and $15 billion. To replace their 10-yr-old, U.S.-built F-104 Star-fighter, the Europeans would like a low-cost, high-performance fighter that could meet military requirements through the 1990s. The U.S. was offering versions of the lightweight fighter--the General Dynamics Corp. YE-16 and the Northrop Corp. YF-17, now in competition for an Air Force production contract [see 9 June]-while the French were offering an improved version of the F-1 Mirage. Pentagon officials claimed both the YE-16 and YE-17 were superior to the Mirage in acceleration and maneuverability despite the more powerful engine in the French aircraft.
The competition would probably be decided as much on economic and political grounds as by military considerations. The French argued that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies should "buy European" and maintain European solidarity. The U.S. emphasized standardization of weapons within NATO and the future willingness of the U.S. to maintain forces in Western Europe. Although the immediate potential customers-Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark-would need about 300 aircraft, American officials were envisaging even larger markets in other West European countries and the world market. (Finney, NYT, 21 July 74, 3)
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