Mar 13 1978
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(New page: NASA and ESA announced selection of experiments for the proposed 2-spacecraft solar-polar mission planned for launch in 1983 and designed for first-time observation of the sun from the...)
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NASA and ESA announced selection of experiments for the proposed 2-spacecraft solar-polar mission planned for launch in 1983 and designed for first-time observation of the sun from the unique perspective of its polar regions. The solar-polar mission would explore one of the remaining frontiers of the solar system: the third dimension of space, out of the plane of the orbits of the planets. All previous interplanetary space probes had flown in the orbits of the planets, essentially intersecting the sun's equatorial regions. Congress had not yet approved the project, but early selection of scientific participants and investigations would allow a prompt start on approval. NASA and ESA would each provide one spacecraft, and the combined scientific payload would be divided between U.S. and European investigators.
The Space Shuttle would launch both spacecraft simultaneously using an inertial upper-stage booster, directing them on a trajectory in the ecliptic plane (the plane containing all the planets) toward Jupiter. Swinging around Jupiter, the craft would use the gravity of that planet to move out of the ecliptic plane and back toward the sun in trajectories, one northbound and one southbound, essentially mirror images of each other. After passing over the north and south solar poles, the spacecrafts would swing through perihelion (the distance closest to the sun) in the ecliptic plane, pass respectively over the other solar poles, then fly back to the vicinity of Jupiter's orbit. The period from launch until shortly after the second pair of polar passages would be approximately 5yr.
The mission should provide important new knowledge about the solar wind, cosmic rays, and the 3-dimensional structure and evolution of the sun's corona (the outermost solar atmosphere), and increase understanding of solar phenomena that shape and control earth's space environment. In anticipation of a FY79 Congressional authorization of the mission, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, manager of the mission for NASA, had undertaken studies of the U.S. spacecraft, payload, and mission design concepts. More than 150 American and European scientists would participate in solar-polar investigations. (NASA Release 78-39; ESA Release Mar 13/78; JPL Universe, Mar 17/78, 1)
NASA had mounted a "new effort" to make space applications the "administration's centerpiece," starting with a reorganization of applications management that could double that office's $283 million budget, Av Wk reported. The new effort would include a major push for a "global information system" supported by all civilian earth-sensing spacecraft, to encompass all Landsat, SEASAT, and environmental and meteorological satellite data, coordinated so that for any need an individual user could access all pertinent information available from space platforms. Theoretically, all space-derived information could some day come from a single distribution point.
NASA's effort would emphasize agency cooperation (NASA officials had met with representatives of the Depts. of Agriculture and Interior, EPA, and AID); management changes (a plan awaiting approval would remove flight projects from the traditional applications branches; the project offices would instead develop user-oriented sensor systems to be passed along to an applications-systems division, which would then reconfigure the sensors into the proper spacecraft format); center changes (instead of the previous lead-center approach to managing flight projects, NASA Hq would formulate programs as the main user liaison); applied sciences (greater emphasis by space applications on the phenomena its spacecraft would measure); ground systems (speedup of work on the end-to-end data system); an operational comsat system (solution of years-old Landsat operating problems); and communications research (industry would foster the research, while government agencies would concentrate on creating and sustaining a real market for public service communications). (Av Wk, Mar 13/78, 67)
For the year ending Dec. 31, 1977, ComSatCorp reported consolidated net income of $32 499 000 ($3.27 per share) compared with $38 271 000 ($3.83 per share) for the preceding year. ComSatCorp said the volume of its services through the INTELSAT system and the contribution to net income by its wholly-owned subsidiary, Comsat General Corp., had increased substantially in 1977. ComSatCorp's leases of INTELSAT fulltime half-circuits to its common-carrier customers had increased 19% between the end of 1976 and the end of 1977, and Comsat General's contribution to net income had increased from 16 cents per share in 1967 to 65 cents per share in 1977. These increases would have put 1977 net income ahead of 1976, except for the FCC proceeding challenging ComSatCorp rates for INTELSAT services.
The FCC's order to deduct from INTELSAT service revenue the amounts placed in escrow pending the outcome of the rate proceeding had adversely affected both 1977 and 1976 net income. The requirement had applied throughout 1977, but for only 6.5mo of 1976; the 1977 amount deducted from INTELSAT service revenue was therefore $37 779 000 more than that for 1976. ComSatCorp said its 1977 financial statements would reflect terms of a proposed settlement of the longstanding FCC rate proceeding. ComSatCorp management had agreed with representatives of the FCC general counsel and Common Carrier Bureau on the proposal, subject to approval by the FCC after an opportunity for public comment ending Mar. 30, 1978. Most of the settlement provisions related to current and future rates, and would affect operations results in 1978 and subsequent years. (COMSAT Release 78-8)
A fundamental reappraisal by Western European governments of the overall European space effort had resulted in a demand by the West German government for more efficiency and better return on its investments in apace, Av Wk reported. On hold during the debate were production of an initial batch of Arianes (European heavy launchers) and development of a new heavy telecommunications bus, as well as adoption of a broad new telecommunications package that would include the heavy bus. Meanwhile, determined to get more for its money, West Germany had begun exploring possible national or limited international programs outside the framework of ESA: Industry sources said that West Germany, traditionally one of ESA's biggest contributors, was unhappy mainly because of repeated new beginnings of experimental communications-satellite programs as technological objectives changed. The Germans had wanted Europe to move directly into an operational comsat project after the successful launch and initial operations of the Franco-German Symphonie satellites. However, instead of building on this initiative, Western Europe (primarily through ESA) had taken up other experimental satellites like OTS (orbital test satellite), Marots (maritime OTS), and the H-Sat (experimental heavy telecommunications/ multipurpose bus). West Germany, therefore, had begun thinking of developing independently (or more probably bilaterally), a direct-broadcast satellite that would be operationally feasible at home and commercially attractive abroad. (Av Wk, Mar 13/78, 71)
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