Sep 25 1978

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(New page: NASA reported that John Yardley, associate administrator for Space Transportation Systems, had testified before the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications on [[Space ...)
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NASA reported that John Yardley, associate administrator for Space Transportation Systems, had testified before the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications on Space Shuttle status. Yardley said a detailed program review of cost, schedule, and performance had indicated substantial progress that year. He cited successful completion of approach and landing tests of Orbiter 101 (Enterprise), which had been shipped to MSFC for mated ground-vibration tests; mission-duration test firings of the main engines at the rated power level; and completion of the first phase of the 3-engine main-propulsion configuration testing.

A review of the Shuttle schedule had shown that all program elements could be ready for a Sept. 28, 1978, first manned orbital flight (FMOF), if all planned tests were successful and if adjustments to the orbiter's maneuvering-system pod and the solid-fuel rocket motors were complete. Unforeseen problems or unsuccessful tests could delay the schedule; however, NASA believed the probability of flying the FMOF during CY1979 was high.

Significant Shuttle problems disclosed by the review had been in the main engine and in vehicle weight. Engine development, although slower than desired, had produced a design that, if tests went well, could be flight-certified by Sept. 1979. The weight problem had not affected early flight tests, but might hamper both the Galileo mission to Jupiter and certain USAF missions. Measures to reduce weight in the orbiter and external tank could satisfy all mission requirements until mid-1984, and performance augmentation options now under study could meet Shuttle mission requirements after that time.

NASA would need additional funding to support the revised FMOF schedule, and to complete the Shuttle design and development test and evaluation program. Funding requirements had arisen not from any single program element but from several items (including the main engines, solid-fuel rocket boosters, external tank, and thermal protection system), on which more work was needed than had been estimated. Shuttle development costs in FY79 and FY80 had exceeded previous plans, and current estimates of total Shuttle development costs were 8 to 9% higher than the earlier estimated $5.2 billion (1971 dollars). NASA had discussed Shuttle funding with OMB as it affected the FY80 budget, and had reviewed with DOD the potential impact if additional Shuttle development funds were unavailable in FY79. Preliminary assessments had shown the first FMOF would be delayed an additional 6 to 9mo beyond the Sept. date, and delivery of production orbiters would be delayed up to 1yr. (NASA Release 78-145; NASA testimony, US Subcomm on Sp Sci & Appl, Sept 28/78; JSC Roundup, Sept 29/78, 1; Marshall Star, Sept 27/78, 1)

The Dept. of Transportation announced that the FAA would install under contract early in 1979 a warning system at 17 additional U.S. air- ports to help pilots avoid hazardous low-level wind shear. Work under the $1.7 million contract would raise to 24 the number of airports with such equipment; the FAA, which had tested wind shear alert systems at seven other airports for a yr, had begun full-time operation of that equipment in early Sept. Wind shear (a change in wind direction and/or speed caused by thunderstorms and fast-moving weather fronts) could be particularly hazardous during takeoff and landing. An aircraft at those times might not have sufficient speed or altitude to recover from sudden and dramatic wind shifts.

The low-level wind shear alert system (LLWSAS) developed for FAA by EMR Telemetry, Sarosota, Fla., used a minicomputer to measure wind speed and direction from as many as 5 wind sensors located on the airport periphery, and to compare these readings with wind data from the airport center. Detection of a significant difference in wind velocity (approximately 15 knots) would trigger aural and visual alarms in the control tower. Alerted by air traffic controllers, pilots could request an alternate runway, adjust approach or takeoff procedures, or execute a missed approach. (FAA Release 77-78)

The People's Republic of China had launched eight spacecraft, some of them military reconnaissance satellites, Av Wk reported. Mainland Chinese had confirmed earlier speculation that reentry packages returned from three PRC spacecraft were of that type. Av Wk also said that Cosmos 1031 launched Sept. 8 from Plesetsk by the USSR, appeared to be a close-look reconnaissance satellite to report on NATO's Northern Wedding exercise to repel a simulated invasion of the Shetland Is. north of Britain. The satellite had an unusual perigee location of 60°N over the Shetlands; its inclination was 62.8°. (Av Wk, Sept. 25/78, 9)

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