Jun 30 1980
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(New page: NASA announced that MSFC had awarded a $230 million cost-plus award-fee contract to Martin Marietta Aerospace For full-scale production of [[Space Shut...)
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NASA announced that MSFC had awarded a $230 million cost-plus award-fee contract to Martin Marietta Aerospace For full-scale production of Space Shuttle external tanks, the only part of the Shuttle not recovered for reuse. Martin Marietta had an earlier contract for design, development, and delivery of nine tanks-three test articles and six flight articles-for Shuttle test flights.
The new contract, for delivery of 7 flight tanks to support Shuttle operating missions, included long lead-time procurement of components and subassemblies for 5 additional tanks and raw material for 24 other additional tanks. Manufacturing of the external tanks would take place at NASAs Michoud Assembly Facility. (NASA Release 80-100; MSFC Release 80-90)
MSFC announced that it planned to reduce the weight of the Shuttle external tank by 6,000 pounds, a change that could increase the Shuttle's payload-carrying capability by about the same amount. The center amended its tank design and development contract with Martin Marietta, adding more than $42.9 million to cover the weight-reduction effort and modify tools used in future production. The change would affect tanks built under a new contract for full-scale tank production to support operational Shuttle launches. The first lightweight external tank would be delivered in the summer of 1982. (MSFC Release 80-93; NASA Release 80-102)
In an editorial headed "Shuttle at the Crossroads," Aviation Week & Space Technology reviewed the delays and difficulties besetting NASAs program, starting with the budget problem in Congress. The first flight, now set for early 1981, would be two years behind schedule, and "even that date may keep on slipping." Technical problems other than tiles included retest of the first set of flight-rated engines "over objections of technical management but with the endorsement of the flight crew." NASAs dilemma in risk assessment was real, particularly because of the tile problem. Aviation Week & Space Technology said: "Loss or damage to one of the orbiters of its limited fleet, not to mention of a crew, could decimate public support and disrupt operations of the shuttle program. On the other hand, at some point fairly soon NASA's top management is going to have to decide that risk has been reduced to a reasonable minimum, draw a deep breath and commit to first flight." (Av Wk, June 30/80, 9)
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