Feb 1 1983
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(New page: NASA transferred operation and management of its Landsat system to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Info...)
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NASA transferred operation and management of its Landsat system to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS) during ceremonies at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Beginning in 1972 with the launch of Landsat-1 (Erts 1, the Earth-resources technology satellite), the Landsat program was a research and development effort to deter-mine the usefulness of satellite multispectral data from synoptic views of the Earth's surface for agricultural and urban planning, geologic exploration, land management, and snowmelt and flood-runoff analysis.
Over the following 10 years NASA had operated four Landsats, including Landsat 4, launched in July 1982, and a ground system at GSFC. Landsat-1 and Landsat-2 were no longer operating; Landsat 3 would be retired later in 1983 because of degradation related to age. In 1979 the Reagan administration told NASA to transfer operation to NOAA so that the latter agency could work toward eventual commercialization of the system.
NASA had relinquished operation of Landsat 4 (except for the thematic mapper, which NASA would continue to use), the control center at GSFC., and the multispectral-scanner data-processing facility, also at GSFC, and would hand over control of the thematic mapper early in 1985. NOAA would also take over the Landsat 4 backup spacecraft (the Landsat D now in final checkout by General Electric) that would replace Landsat 4, probably in mid-1985. NOAA would reimburse NASA for the use of buildings and utilities. (NASA Release 83-7)
February 1-11: Despite "intense efforts" to communicate with Viking lander 1 on the surface of Mars, silent since mid-November, controllers and scientists at JPL and a Martin Marietta group had received no signals during a scheduled downlink February 11. Since February 1 they had sent commands that should have started the lander's on-board computer executing the steps needed to transmit to Earth. Declining battery power on the lander was thought to have tripped a protective low-voltage switch that shut down major subsystems; if the commands had been followed, the lander would have communicated February 11.
JPL would go ahead with efforts to reestablish contact, which would be unsuccessful if the lander had multiple problems. No telemetry data were available to diagnose the situation. The 64-meter Deep Space Tracking Net-work antenna, near Canberra, had bombarded the lander on Mars with 80-to 100-kilowatt signals, said George Gianopulos, Viking team leader at JPL. Gianopulos said that commands from JPL through Australia could be up to 40° off the receiving line into the leader's antenna dish and still be picked up. Getting into the lander to reset the switch "is going to be a neat trick," he added.
Launched August 20, 1975, and designed for a 90-day mission, Viking 1 had shown "incredible stamina" in the harsh environment of Mars. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) could provide power for years, but in 1982 its four nickel-cadmium batteries began to show their age. Viking could be instructed to charge or discharge batteries to keep them functioning longer. A command sent November 19 to repeat this exercise apparently got into the antenna-pointing subroutine and switched the crucial communications antenna to point away from Earth. (NASA Dly Acty Rpt, Feb 16/83; JSC Roundup, Jan 28/83, 1)
A NASA team investigating space-suit failures that occurred during STS-5 issued a report listing ways to improve and simplify contractor test and inspection procedures. Regulators and motors would undergo more extensive testing on the Shuttle orbiter just before being stored, and space suits would be fully tested the day before a scheduled space walk. The first failure to be detected, shutdown of a fan motor while Joseph P. Allen was donning his suit, was the fault of sensors in the motor electronics. The other failure, that of an oxygen regulator in William Lenoir's suit, resulted from the absence of two tiny devices holding a regulator spring in place. (NASA Release 83-9)
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