Mar 13 1985
From The Space Library
RobertG (Talk | contribs)
(New page: The NY Times reported that NASA officials said the next Space Shuttle mission would not occur until mid-April as a result of the time needed to repair two one-foot-sq. punctures in one...)
Newer edit →
Current revision
The NY Times reported that NASA officials said the next Space Shuttle mission would not occur until mid-April as a result of the time needed to repair two one-foot-sq. punctures in one of the cargo bay doors of the orbiter Discovery. NASA officials said Discovery would definitely fly the mission, although they had considered substituting Challenger. Rockwell Internatl. was fabricating the replacement material for the punctures and would fly the material to Cape Canaveral that day or the next.
Although NASA could not set a launch date until it had completed repairs, unidentified sources said that, if all went well, launch would be about April 19. (NYT, March 13/85, A14)
Launch Vehicles
Japan's highest space policy board, the Space Activities Commission, adopted in a meeting of its four commission members a plan to begin in FY 85 development of a rocket booster capable of putting a two-ton geostationary satellite into orbit, FBIS, KYODO in English reported. The new booster, code named H-II, a two-stage, 240-ton liquid-fueled rocket, 46-m high and 4-m in diameter, would dwarf the country's biggest rocket, N-II, whose capacity was up to 350 kg. Officials expected the project to cost 200 billion yen and take six to seven years to complete.
The commission also agreed to start work on a science satellite and geostationary weather satellite, both intended for 1989 launch, and authorized the design, beginning in FY 85, of a space module that Japan would construct as part of an international space station program planned for early in the 1990s. (KYODO in English, Mar 13/85)
The USSR was expected to sign an unprecedented information exchange agreement with INTELSAT, with a commitment to join the international consortium within two years, the Washington Post reported, a tacit admission that its own Eastern Bloc competitor to INTELSAT-Intersputnik did not meet all the USSR's telecommunications needs. INTELSAT was awaiting V.A. Shamshin, minister of posts and telecommunications in the USSR, to sign the proposed agreement sent the previous week.
The U.S., creator of the 21-year-old INTELSAT system and its biggest single user, had no legal means to prevent INTELSAT from sharing technology with, or granting admission to, the USSR. The Reagan Administration said it would adopt a wait-and-see approach to the proposed agreement, which posed no security danger because the U.S. used INTELSAT solely for commercial purposes.
In the past the Soviets had used the INTELSAT system on a limited basis and never exchanged technical information with the West nor allowed the Eastern Bloc countries access to the system (with the exception of Yugoslavia, which was a full member of the consortium). INTELSAT, however, did not encourage its members to use the Intersputnik system. (W Post, Mar 13/85, Al)
In a commentary in the Washington Times in response to a U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study that had asserted NASA's plans for a permanent space station were not scientifically, economically, or militarily justified, Robert Melton, assistant professor at Pennsylvania State University, wrote that the study missed the point of NASA's current efforts to define better what should go into the station before proceeding with actual design and construction. He wrote that NASA had entered Phase B, the definition study of the project, in which contractors would provide NASA with thorough analyses of exactly what missions would be carried out in what time schedule and with descriptions of necessary equipment and technology together with a breakdown of costs. Such a detailed study was necessary to avoid premature overemphasis on design and to avert technical problems as the program progressed.
Melton argued that the permanent space station was a logical next step after the Space Shuttle program and could serve as both a laboratory and base of operations for scientific, commercial, and security purposes. The space station could also serve as a permanent base for repairing and routinely servicing satellites, as a depot for permanently, space-based orbital transfer vehicles capable of delivering and retrieving high-orbit payloads, and as a base for building other large structures that would remain in orbit.
Melton noted that the benefits of a permanent space station would make the $8 billion expenditure spread over several years seem a fairly small amount, especially when compared to other items in the federal budget. However, Melton acknowledged that the OTA study proved NASA had to do a better job of defining its space station goals and of impressing upon the public the importance of the project. (W Times, Mar 13/85, 2D)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
