Jun 20 1985
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(New page: The House Science and Technology Committee today completed mark-up of legislation authorizing funding to transfer the land remote-sensing system operations to Eosat, a joint venture of Hug...)
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The House Science and Technology Committee today completed mark-up of legislation authorizing funding to transfer the land remote-sensing system operations to Eosat, a joint venture of Hughes and RCA, Aerospace Daily reported. The legislation, H.R. 2800, was identical to a measure reported out by the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee the previous week. Both bills amended the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 that authorized $75 million in FY 85 for such activities. The House bill authorized $295 million for transfer activities in the FY 85-89 period, of which not more than $125 million would be available for FY 85-86.
The Commerce Department and Eosat, which was selected the previous fall to operate the system, had not yet finalized the contract, but a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) official told Congress the contract would be signed within two weeks. Eosat was proposing to provide two satellites and a new ground station for a fixed price of $250 million, satellite hardware continuing present capabilities with improvements, greater data processing capabilities at the new ground station, and a program covering 10 years. Government funding would occur in the first five years. (AID, June 21/85, 1)
NASA announced it would test on Space Shuttle mission 51-F, scheduled for mid-July 1985, a Coca Cola Co. technology, developed at its own initiative and expense, to dispense its carbonated beverage in space [see NASA/Technology Transfer, May 9]. Previously it was impossible for astronauts to consume carbonated soft drinks in microgravity because there was no way to dispense the beverages. The test was part of an agreement between NASA and Coca-Cola under which the company would grant NASA a license to use the company's patented technology, a specially designed can, for unrestricted use in dispensing carbonated beverages in space. NASA would also receive the technical information necessary to fabricate its own cans.
NASA added that other companies in the carbonated beverage industry were welcome to propose different technology for the same purpose. (NASA Release 85-96)
NASA announced that a mishap investigation board had completed its report on a March 8 accident in which the Space Shuttle Discovery's payload bay door was damaged and a technician was injured during prelaunch preparations for mission 51-D at KSC [see Space Transportation System/Launch Schedules, March 8].
In its executive summary, the board reported that "the immediate cause of the mishap was the failure of a master link in one of the two redundant hoist systems that raise and lower the payload bay access platform." The report then noted, "The mishap can be characterized as the culmination of a series of events and conditions that pushed the mechanical components to and beyond their limits." In the accident, a payload bay access platform used to provide access to the orbiter's cargo bay fell from its stowed position on a rolling bridge crane. Tracing the events and conditions that led to the accident, the board noted that "Operators of the payload bay access platforms customarily stowed the platforms by raising them until the telescoping tubes contacted the (single) upper-limit switch that stopped its upward travel.
"On March 4, a Lockheed Space Operations Co. (LSOC) technician reported a broken upper-limit switch that had caused the telescoping structure to impact the supporting structure. In crane and hoist parlance, this is called 'two-blocking.' The inboard master link failed at this time, and cable over-wrap was noted on that portion of the winch. The entire up-down portion of this system was tagged out with a 'Do Not Operate' tag, since only one half of the redundant hoist system remained intact. This tag was placed on the operating controls along with two other similarly appearing tags, both several months old, describing limitations on the operation of the platforms." The board's summary then noted the platforms were operated at least twice and stowed at least once between March 4 and the March 8 accident. "During the stowing operation(s), given the fact of a broken upper-limit switch and the standard operating procedure, it is an inescapable conclusion that additional two-blocking occurred. This imparted extremely high loads to the master link in the remaining wire rope assembly, fracturing it almost to the point of sufficient separation for the assembly to fall. When the bridge assembly was moved on the morning of March 8, the resulting jolt was enough to complete the break, and the platform assembly fell." The board recommended that there be a revision of operating procedures and operator training to ensure the upper-limit switches not be used as operational stops, of tagout/lockout procedures to prevent unauthorized use of equipment that had been identified as unsafe, and of the platform preventive maintenance procedures to meet all KSC and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards; a modification of the design of the payload bay access platform to include the addition of an operational stop and load sensing device in the wire rope system; and a redesign of the telescoping tubes to facilitate the required inspection of critical linkages.
The board estimated damage to Discovery and access platform at $200,000 and noted that the accident delayed rollover to the Vehicle Assembly Building from March 8 until March 23. (NASA Release 85-95)
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