Aug 23 1985
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In the first test of the precision location/strike system (PLSS), three TR-1 aircraft picked up a radar signal like one an enemy might use to guide a missile attack and passed the signal direction and time data to a ground station computer. The computer analyzed the data, compared inputs from the three aircraft, and pinpointed where the radar signal was coming from, the Air Force Systems Command Newsreview reported. If the source had been an enemy site for radar-directed missiles, artillery, or an anti-aircraft system, the U.S. Air Force could quickly direct an F-16 to it for an attack. The PLSS passed the test by zeroing in on a prepositioned radar emitter the moment its signal started.
Lt. Col. Dayl Donahey, PLSS program director for the Aeronautical Systems Division, called it “a giant leap forward” for future wartime capabilities of U.S. tactical forces. “The system performed better than expected at this point in its development testing,” he said.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. was developing the PLSS, which featured an integrated, lethal mix of ground-based and airborne electronics.
In an operational scenario, the three highly instrumented, high-altitude TR-1 s would fly race-track patterns behind the forward edge of a battle area. Around the clock, in all kinds of weather, the TR-1 listening platforms would detect enemy electronic transmissions. Despite dense electromagnetic interference, the TR-ls could pick up individual pulses of enemy radar. (AFSC Newsreview, Aug 23/85, 1)
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) Geobotanical Remote Sensing Group was developing technologies of spectral analysis to acquire a total picture of earth's vegetation-wild and cultivated, trees and plants-the JPL Universe reported. The group was adapting techniques developed for space exploration to devise, build, and test spaceborne instruments that would work in conjunction with ground-based monitoring, data-recording, and analysis devices.
The group was employing every available technology-radar, microwave, and infrared analysis-as well as effective procedures for using them. The goal was to develop technology to identify types of vegetation, the area of coverage, and general conditions from field to field, area to area, continent to continent. JPL was working closely with the University of California in the project, particularly the university's Kearney Agricultural Center, to diagnose crop conditions based on factors such as irrigation, insect infestation, and the spread of plant diseases.
In the program, satellites bounced radar off earth's vegetation, in a sense taking its pulse and temperature. At the same time, ground-based studies used, among other techniques, a truck-transported basket like a cherry picker to gather radar as well as infrared measurements similar to those from Landsat and other earth-surveillance satellites. Particularly helpful to the program was JPL's Space Shuttle imaging radar, which was unaffected by darkness or obscuring clouds. The instrument was on an October 1984 Space Shuttle mission and would fly again in 1987.
Data analysis in the program employed several approaches. In one, analysts gave a computer a statistical model and commanded it to survey recorded data to seek out similar conditions throughout the globe, thus providing insights into vegetation identity and condition. Other studies concentrated on the use of physical models to relate spectral data to parameters such as green-leaf area and water status.
Comparison of space-derived and ground-based images and data determined how they differed and how they complimented one another. This permitted monitoring of crop and natural vegetation conditions on a worldwide basis and offered insights into the effects of acid rain and other pollution on crops and forests, in lakes and ponds, and into conditions and changes of arid lands. (JPL Universe, Aug 23/85, 1)
The testing of the AFTI/F-111 mission adaptive wing program at NASA's Ames-Dryden Flight Research Center (DRFC) was an important milestone, the DRFC X-Press reported. It was the aircraft's first taxi under its own power in four-and-a-half years.
In the test, the control room was fully staffed, the air crew was aboard the aircraft just as they would be for the first flight, and the airplane operated as if it were ready to fly. Engineers checked and verified all aircraft and control room displays, including the mission adaptive wing color panel that duplicated cockpit displays and featured a caution panel that identified discretes, a trouble-shooting tool.
“Things went really well,” said Ames DRFC AFTI/F-111 project manager Louis Steers. “There were some small problems on the aircraft, but no show stoppers.” (DFRC X-Press, Aug 30/85, 2)
Under a 1985 memorandum of agreement, the Eglin Air Force Base's armament division was leading a joint U.S., British, and West German project to determine how a non-nuclear, long-range standoff missile should be developed, the Air Force Systems Command Newsreview reported. General Dynamics and Boeing Aerospace Co., which had 15-month contracts to study the possibilities, was working with subcontractors from the other two countries.
The countries could use the conventional, low-altitude subsonic missile, launched from air or ground, primarily against airfields. The immediate goal of the project was to design the system, develop a procurement program and schedule, and identify technological transfers among the three countries.
The point of the agreement was to save money and eliminate duplication of effort in development of a needed weapon system. One country would build the system, but the others would support the effort. While the U.S. completed the procurement package, England provided most of the threat information needed to design the missile. West Germany was taking an active part in all project phases. (AFSC Newsreview, Aug 23/85, 3)
NASA and Department of Defense September 11: The U.S. Air Force announced today that it had selected Air Force Undersecretary Edward “Pete” Aldridge to fly on the first Space Shuttle mission launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Arizona Daily Star reported. The Air Force said Aldridge and Air Force Maj. John Brett Watterson would serve as payload specialists with five astronauts named by NASA for the Defense Department's mission set for launch March 20, 1986.
Aldridge, 47, who had been Air Force undersecretary since 1981, said in a statement, “I'm thrilled at the opportunity and thrilled at the prospects that I will be able to apply what I have learned to expanding U.S. efforts in space.” NASA and the U.S. Air Force were building the Vandenberg Space Shuttle launch facility primarily for military missions. Because the Space Shuttle could be launched from there directly south, it could go into a north-south orbit that covered the entire globe, passing over both poles and allowing Space Shuttle crews to observe Soviet military forces anywhere in the world.
Space Shuttles launched from Kennedy Space Center could not go directly north or south because they would fly over inhabited areas during the initial minutes of flight, possibly endangering the population if something went wrong. Those Space Shuttles launched into east-west orbits did not fly any closer than about 2000 miles to the poles. (Ariz. Daily Star, Sept 12/85, A3)
Procurement August 2: McDonnell Douglas Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Sanford McDonnell in a letter to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger explained a company policy that instituted “expanded, no-questions-asked” refund policies on the sale of spare parts and support equipment to the U.S., foreign countries, and commercial customers worldwide, Defense Daily reported.
McDonnell said the government could return “any covered spare part or piece of support equipment if there is any dissatisfaction with its cost-no questions asked.” McDonnell described the refund policy as the most comprehensive in the aerospace industry and said that if the military felt it must retain an item in stock for operational readiness, “their complaint will be addressed without concern for a time limit.” Under the new policy, the military could, if dissatisfied with the price, return within six months of delivery new and unused parts or equipment built by McDonnell Douglas and purchased under prime contracts. The company said the policy applied to prices to the government up to $100,000; at that level the company furnished cost data in advance of establishing price.
Earlier Weinberger directed establishment of a standard industry-wide refund policy based on voluntary refund policies of Boeing Co. and the General Electric Co. The Boeing/General Electric refund programs accepted for credit the return of any spare parts or support equipment that the Pentagon considered to be unreasonably priced. (D/D, Aug 2/85, 1)
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