Feb 5 1986
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(New page: Further investigation into the Challenger accident opened a number of theories into the booster rocket's failure. One pointed to bad fuel segments, perhaps caused by cold temperatures....)
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Further investigation into the Challenger accident opened a number of theories into the booster rocket's failure. One pointed to bad fuel segments, perhaps caused by cold temperatures. "Propellants can crack the way you crack a cookie. When they crack...it allows you new sites where gases can be generated," opined Herman Krier from the University of Illinois. Another theory suggested that improper handling had produced hairline cracks while fuel segments were cast or during launch preparation, or that installation of badly joined seams between the fuel segments caused uneven burning. It was noted that workers ignored standard operating procedures. A third theory looked into the possibility that a solid-rocket booster nozzle had burned through, as had nearly happened on a previous flight. Still another theory cited cold weather or vibrations resulting from launch as a possible culprit for a failure in the suspected seam that joined two fuel segments. Other theories speculated that the external tank experienced overheating, leading to expansion of its contents and rupture of the tank, or even direct bum-through from the 5,900 degrees of exhaust leaving the rocket booster or that there might have been a pre-existing hole in the tank. However the hydrogen came to leak, it was ignited by the heated air surrounding it or by the thin flame from the solid rocket.
NASA Engineers thought, in that point in the investigation, that cold weather had no adverse affect on either the solid fuel or the seals, but were concerned with the possibility of leakage between segments of the rocket motors because deterioration of these seals had been noted on previous flights. Back up seals, they added, performed adequately. (P Ind, Feb 5/86; Feb 10/86; W Times, Feb 5/86; Feb 6/86; Feb 7/86; CSM, Feb 5/86; C Trib, Feb 5/86; Feb 6/86; Feb 7/86; NY Times, Feb 5/86; Feb 7/86; Feb 9/86; B Sun, Feb 6/86; Feb 7/86; WSJ, Feb 6/86)
The President's Space Shuttle Commission gathered in private before beginning its formal investigation into the disaster. Headed by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, the Commission planned to weigh all of the evidence and make a recommendation, with assistance from NASA, after 120 days. (USA Today, Feb 5/86)
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