Jun 15 1971
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(New page: USAF launched unidentified satellite at 11:41 PDT from Vandenberg AFB on new Titan IIID booster. Satellite entered orbit with 289.7-km (180-mi) apogee, 178.6-km (111-mi) perigee, 8...)
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USAF launched unidentified satellite at 11:41 PDT from Vandenberg AFB on new Titan IIID booster. Satellite entered orbit with 289.7-km (180-mi) apogee, 178.6-km (111-mi) perigee, 89.1- min period, and 96.3° inclination. Booster used five-segment, 3-m (10-ft) solid-fuel strap-on boosters and was reportedly capable of placing 6800 kg (15 000 lbs) in low earth orbit. Satellite reentered Aug. 6. (GSFC SSR, 6/30/71; 8/31/71; SBD, 6/18/71, 258; Pres Rpt 72)
NASA announced completion of supercritical wing shakedown flights aboard modified USN F-8 jet fighter from FRC. Last flight in eight- flight series to allow test pilots to "get feel" of aircraft and investigate effects on wing at various speeds and altitudes, had taken place May 26. FRc officials reported finding no "surprises" during test series and said air foil appeared to confirm wind-tunnel tests. Research aircraft would be off flight status for two months while small irregularities on wing surface were corrected and network of about 250 pressure sensors was added to wing's top surface to locate and measure any shock wave created in air flow. Effectiveness of supercritical wing depended on moving shock wave to near back of wing for increase in total wing efficiency. (NASA Release 71-101)
Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of House Armed Services Committee, announced that he would move to block $806-million procurement funds for USN F-14 jet fighter aircraft until USN solved overcost problems. Funds were included in $21.9-billion military weapons authorization bill before House. (AP, W Post, 6/16/71, A2)
Grumman Aerospace Corp. released statement saying it would be "very appropriate" for Congress to stop funding USN's F-14 jet fighter aircraft until cost-overrun problems were settled. (W Star, 6/16/71, A4)
Dr. Vasily V. Parin-Soviet physiologist, former President of Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, and member of Soviet Academy of Sciences-died at age 68 of liver ailment. Dr. Parin had been known primarily for his work during 1960s on human physiological problems during space flight and had authored studies on effect of weightlessness on functioning of heart and circulatory system. He had received Order of Lenin, U.S.S.R's highest award, in 1963 for his work in developing Soviet medical science. (AP, NYT, 6/17/71, 42)
June 15-17: House Committee on Science and Astronautics' Subcommittee on NASA Oversight held hearings on failure of Atlas-Centaur to launch Ats 4 into planned orbit Aug. 10, 1968, and failure to orbit OAS-B Nov. 30, 1970, and Mariner 8 May 8, 1971. Dr. George M. Low, NASA Deputy Administrator, testified June 15 on NASA policy on backup spacecraft and Centaur reliability: "In the manned program, all possible steps are taken to assure the safety of the astronauts. Single point failures are reduced to an absolute minimum. Missions are planned to build upon the previous missions so as to reduce the number of unknowns." Within missions, "plateaus are established so that all systems can be checked out in real time prior to committing to the next plateau. Vigorous testing procedures coupled with redundancy and in many cases dual redundancy are adopted before a system is 'man-rated.' " In Skylab "we are building a back-up workshop which will be brought right up to the point of actual checkout. This will permit us to proceed with the program even in the event that the first work-shop would not be successfully launched. Similarly, we will have a single back-up Command and Service Module-Saturn IB capability for the three manned visits to the workshop" Capability was built into program and was "key to the plan for a rescue capability in Skylab which we recently adopted." In earth-orbital automated programs "we generally plan a series of related missions, using identical or similar hardware. If we have a mission failure, decisions will then be made, based on all available factors, whether we will (1) prepare and fly a specific back-up to the mission which failed, (2) modify succeeding flights . .. to achieve the objectives, or (3) defer achieving the mission objectives to future years." In planetary programs, with launch opportunities at only discrete intervals, NASA usually had provided for two identical launches. Each launch in dual mission was planned to complement its twin, while at same time serving as backup if twin were lost. This year Mariner 9 was backup, flying hybrid mission. Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle had history of 3 failures out of 16 operational vehicles, without apparent relationship between failures, giving probability of success of 80% if based solely on past experience. Launch vehicles for automated missions-such as Scout, Delta, and Atlas-Centaur-were "complex systems without much redundancy, and cannot be expected to achieve reliabilities much greater than about 90% without very major and costly changes. They certainly cannot be considered `man-rated' vehicles." Addition of redundant systems would be investigated again but was not complete solution. Redundancy added weight, reduced payload capability, and was expensive. For launch vehicles of size of Titan-Centaur, which would carry Viking and Grand Tour payloads, additional redundancy might be practicable and desirable and would be actively studied. Major increase in reliability of achieving orbit would be one of important attributes of space shuttle. Dr. John E. Naugle, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, on June 16 continued testimony on backup philosophy, expanding on application in OSSA: "We do not schedule backup missions for observatory spacecraft. We always buy, and intend to fly, at least two flight units of a new series of observatory-class spacecraft. When we have a failure or a malfunction in a spacecraft or a launch vehicle we will always do everything possible to thoroughly understand and correct all other future missions which could conceivably be subject to a similar malfunction. When we have a failure we will always review the effect of the loss on the program, determine the alternative recovery plans by which we can attain the objectives of the lost mission, assess the cost and any other impact of the alternatives on the program and then decide which alternative to choose." Vincent L. Johnson, Deputy Administrator for Space Science and Applications, testified June 17: "In the basic considerations which establish the philosophical approach to reliability of unmanned space vehicles, the over-riding necessity for protection of the lives of human passengers is absent. The result is an approach to reliability in which cost and simplicity play a much larger part. We have not imposed a requirement for total elimination of single point failure modes, but have concentrated upon reducing the probability of failure by careful design, parts application, major quality and reliability efforts, and, most importantly, tender loving care. Our launch vehicles . . are characterized as simplex systems, implying lack of the complexity characteristic of redundancy." (Testimony; Subcom Rpt, 10/71)
Representatives of nine European Space Conference member countries and five Atlantic and Pacific area countries met at FAA Hq. to explore possibilities for unified preoperational program in aeronautical satellites over Pacific and Atlantic Ocean areas. At final meeting, group decided to establish International Collaboration Ad Hoc Group to make specific proposals for unified program to Second Aeronautical Satellite Meeting in Madrid Aug. 3. (FAA Releases 71-91, 71-93)
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