May 24 1985
From The Space Library
In reporting on NASA's concerns over the effects of vibrations and noise on the Space Shuttle's passengers and cargo, the Washington Post quoted astronaut Air Force Col. Frederick Gregory saying that after his return from a Space Shuttle mission that "Nothing prepared me for the sensation of those main engines starting and those solids lighting up underneath us. That son-of-a-gun really rattles and rolls when it takes off." Although NASA maintained that the Space Shuttle was no rougher a ride than the Titan launch vehicle, doubts were creeping into the minds of some people planning the Space Shuttle program, the Post said.
Troubles arose on Gregory's flight when astronauts discovered the latch that released the airlock holding the Spacelab wide-field camera was badly bent-possibly because of the rough ride. In another Spacelab incident, all pressure was lost after four days in the laser spectrometer at the heart of an experiment to measure molecules of synthetic chemicals that could be attacking the earth's protective ozone layer.
Space Shuttle managers were quick to defend the spacecraft, the Post reported. Columbia, Challenger, and Discovery had flown 17 times in four years without a serious incident. At least two of the three satellites that failed in space did so because of onboard rocket engine difficulties, not because the Space Shuttle was too rough.
Johnson Space Center Director Gerald Griffin said in an interview with the Post that "occasional" mistakes had led to mishaps, but he insisted that "we are not repeating our mistakes." He used as an example the Syncom (Leasat3) satellite deployed in April with no power to raise it to a higher orbit. He said that NASA would not have deployed the Syncom without any power if NASA had insisted that Hughes Communications Corp install a device that flashed a warning to the Space Shuttle's cockpit that the satellite had no power.
"We've always insisted our customers adhere to our safety standards to protect the crew and the shuttle, but we've never insisted they do anything else," Griffin said. "We don't want to be 'Big Brother' but we're beginning to think that some of the [the customers] design features are not good for us. I'd like to see more data for the crew in the cockpit." (W Post, May 24/85, Al)
Spacelab 2 mission manager Roy Lester of Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Spacelab Payload Project Office said today that the Spacelab 2 payload was declared "ready for installation" into the orbiter Challenger, the Marshall Star reported. Spacelab 2 would be the second of two Spacelab missions designed to demonstrate the performance of hardware received from the European Space Agency (ESA).
The Spacelab 1 mission verified the majority of Spacelab systems including the habitable module, tunnel, scientific airlock, and pallets. For the second verification mission, Spacelab would not use a habitable module but only a pallet configuration. The crew would operate experiments from Challenger's aft flight deck.
Spacelab 2 consisted of a pressurized igloo approximately the size of a five-gallon oil drum and three pallets, two of which joined to form the train needed to support several experiments. Also new on the mission was the instrument pointing system for pointing four of the onboard solar experiments. Spacelab would carry 13 experiments in 7 scientific disciplines. Primary objective of the mission was to demonstrate the performance of the igloo, the two-pallet train, and the instrument pointing system.
John Thomas, manager of the MSFC Spacelab Program Office, said NASA had removed Spacelab 3 hardware from Challenger's cargo bay and was reconfiguring the bay for Spacelab 2. "We expect to begin installation of the Spacelab 2 payload on June 3," he noted.
The last major test for the hardware before July 12 scheduled launch would be an end-to-end test planned for June 10, in which NASA would test all systems connecting Challenger, Spacelab 2, and the MSFC-operated payload operations control center (POCC) at Johnson Space Center. Thomas said the other primary effort was to complete training of the payload team. (Marshall Star, May 29/85, 1)
NASA announced it was negotiating an agreement with Hughes Communications, Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Hughes Aircraft Co.) to develop jointly plans for a Space Shuttle mission to attempt salvage of the Hughes Leasat 3 satellite then in orbit [see Space Transportation System/ Missions, Apr. 17].
As a result of Hughes's negotiations with New York- and London-based underwriters insuring Leasat 3, Lloyd's and other European underwriters had agreed to proceed with the attempted salvage. Hughes was continuing negotiations with U.S. underwriters.
Although the joint salvage effort would include activities never before attempted, it was based in large part on experience gained by NASA during its April 1984 repair of the Solar Maximum Mission satellite and its retrieval November 1984 of the Palapa B-2 and Westar VI satellites.
Pending an independent review of safety considerations by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, the mission would occur during Space Shuttle flight 51-L scheduled for no earlier than August 24. The salvage plan called for modification to the satellite by two of the Space Shuttle crew during rendezvous with it to permit ground command of the satellite. Ground command would then perform the activation sequence, normally performed by an automatic timer onboard the satellite. Modification made during the rendezvous would bypass all hardware likely to have caused the Leasat 3 failure. (Although Hughes had identified satellite activation components and circuits as the cause of the failure, the company had not determined, due to limited flight data, a specific cause of the failure.)
In its dormant state, the satellite was experiencing temperatures well below the design and test limits of the liquid- and sold-fuel propellant systems, electronic units, batteries, and all other components. These factors, combined with the complexity of the modifications by the Space Shuttle crew, limited the chances of success.
Hughes Communications, Inc. would contract with NASA for the costs, at that time under assessment, for preparation and execution of the mission. (NASA 85-77)
NASA had brought under control a $50-million weather satellite, NOAA-8, that had tumbled helplessly in space for nearly a year due to a malfunctioning oscillator, the Washington Times reported.
The defective oscillator gave out during April, allowing NASA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) scientists to activate a backup oscillator and reprogram the satellite via remote control. NOAA was checking and calibrating the spacecraft's instruments before putting it July 8 into service to transmit daily weather photos and information. (W Times, May 24/85, 3A; W Post, May 24, 85, A8)
The U.S. Senate voted today, 74 to 9, to approve a proposal by Sen. John Warner (R-Va.) to allow three final-stage antisatellite tests next year as long as President Reagan told Congress the test would not disrupt negotiations aimed at banning antisatellite weapons, the Washington Post reported. The Senate previously rejected, 51 to 35, a testing ban proposed by Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.).
The U.S. antisatellite (ASAT) weapon was a small warhead atop a rocket carried by an F-15 jet to the edge of space, where it was released to pursue its target. Although the U.S. had tested the weapon in stages, the U.S. had not fired the weapon against a target in space. The Pentagon had scheduled that final round of testing to begin within several months.
During the Geneva negotiations on weapons reductions, the USSR sought a halt to ASAT tests, while the Reagan Administration said it was open to such a proposal but had refused to halt ASAT testing as a condition to talks.
In 1984 Congress banned tests of the U.S. system in hopes the pause might help negotiations, which had not then started.
The Washington Post earlier had reported that electronic problems would raise the cost of the antisatellite system and stretched out its testing program. The Air Force planned a test, originally scheduled for fall 1984, for late July in which the target would be two metallic balloons attached to an orbiting satellite.
However, the Air Force was cautious about the first test against a target in space, fearing that a well-publicized failure would hurt the space defense program. Sources told the Post that it might be impossible for the Air Force to carry out a second test of the weapon against the balloon target in space during the current fiscal year. Originally the Air Force had planned for three tests in 1985. (W Post, May 25/85, A4; May 16/85, A27)
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