Feb 10 1986
From The Space Library
NASA reported that the United States and the United Kingdom had recently agreed to cooperate in the development of technology for an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft. The ASTOVL aircraft would have the advantages of an advanced supersonic fighter aircraft, but with the added capability of landing vertically. The cooperative research program would investigate four propulsion concepts: vectored thrust, ejector augmenter, tandem fan, and remote augmented lift system. The memorandum of understanding was signed by William R. Graham, NASA Acting Administrator, and Donald A. Hicks, Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, for the United States, and by Sir David Perry, Chief of Defense Equipment Collaboration, for the United Kingdom. (NASA Release 86-10)
NASA announced that it had postponed three launches: the Ulysses mission to investigate the poles of the sun; the Galileo mission to orbit Jupiter and send a probe into the planet; and the Astro-1 mission, an ultraviolet astronomy laboratory mounted in the Shuttle's payload bay that was to examine quasars, "hot" stars, galaxy centers, and Halley’s Comet. The Ulysses and Galileo missions were scheduled for launch from a Shuttle in May, but both launches were dependent on certain relative positions of Jupiter and Earth, occurring only once every 13 months. The Astro-l had to be launched in the March-April timeframe in order to observe Halley’s Comet, and with that opportunity gone no new date was requested. The delays were caused by the January Space Shuttle accident. (NASA Release 86-11; NY Times, Feb 11/86)
Advisors at NASA determined that future dependence on the Shuttle for all space operations would be contradictory to a reliable space transportation program. After several days of interviews, a 13-member panel, comprised of aviation and aerospace veterans, concluded that expendable launch vehicles should have greater consideration because the Shuttle was a research vehicle. (W Post, Feb 11/86)
The Presidential Commission questioned NASA scientists regarding faulty o-rings as a cause of the Challenger accident. The panel learned that these seals could indeed malfunction in cold weather and also that erosion (not the result of cold weather) had occurred in 6 of 171 seals on previous flights. Morton Thiokol, the firm responsible for manufacturing the o-rings, had raised concerns about launching the Shuttle in cold weather, but NASA engineers concluded that the backup ring would function if the primary seal failed. Released NASA documents also showed concern expressed by engineers, who, three years prior to the accident, concluded that the mechanism for sealing segments of the Solid Rocket Booster could fall and result in "loss of mission, vehicle, and crew." One risk analysis received by NASA from an outside agency estimated the chances for an accident involving the boosters as 1 in 35.
NASA's safety advisory board stated in their 1985 annual report that 18 Shuttle flights per year were "very optimistic" because these launches were anything but routine. However, "the requirement to launch has not been a pre-requisite," said acting NASA Administrator Dr. William R. Graham, "The prerequisite has been safety." (Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Presidential Commission on Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Feb 11/86; P Inq, Feb 12/86; Feb 13/86; B Sun, Feb 12/86; Feb 13/86; CSM, Feb 12/86; Feb 13/86; C Trib, Feb 12/86; Feb 14/86; Feb 13/86; WSJ, Feb 12/86; USA Today, Feb 12/86; Feb 13/86; NY Times, Feb 13/86; W Post, Feb 13/86)
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