Feb 26 1986
From The Space Library
As further testimony was heard by the President's Commission, NASA manager Larry Mulloy stated that objections made by Morton Thiokol engineers to halt liftoff seemed illogical, but added that had he known that all of the company's engineers held the opinion, he might have changed his mind. Other testimony given by NASA officials conceded that they argued against the idea of cold weather being detrimental to a launch, but had little data to demonstrate this, and insisted that this opposition in no way pressured Morton Thiokol management to reverse the recommendation of its engineers. (Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Presidential Commission On Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Feb 26/86; NY Times, Feb 27/86; C Trib, Feb 27/86; LA Times, Feb 27/86; W Post, Feb 27/86; P Inq, Feb 27/86; W Times, Feb 27/86; WSJ, Feb 27/86)
The Challenger accident forced NASA to reconsider expendable launch vehicles as a means for putting satellites into space. Believed to have been rendered obsolete by the Shuttle, these rockets were once again deemed necessary for meeting the growing schedule of launches. The change of position notwithstanding, NASA and the Department of Defense appeared ready to request another orbiter. (B Sun, Feb 27/68)
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