Jun 12 2003
From The Space Library
U.S. Representative Bart Gordon (D-TN), senior Democrat on the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, introduced H. R. 2450, the Human Space Flight Independent Investigation Commission Act, in an effort to ensure that future investigations of human spaceflight accidents would remain independent and “free from any perception that [NASA] is hiding something.” Gordon had wanted President George W. Bush to appoint an independent commission, free of any NASA personnel, to investigate the Columbia disaster~ similar to the commission that had investigated the Challenger accident in 1986. Instead, NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe had to revise the charter of the CAIB three times before the Board had attained a measure of independence. Moreover, the Board still included one NASA official and relied on NASA staff, an arrangement that Gordon feared would undermine the credibility of the CAIB's final report. H.R. 2450 proposed that, in the event of another disaster, the investigative panel would follow the Challenger model, requiring a 15-member commission, with the chairperson of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) serving as a member and the President of the United States appointing the other 14. Under the terms of the Act, commission members would have diverse backgrounds, although some would also have spaceflight and accident investigation experience. The resolution also stipulated that NASA personnel could not serve, either on the investigative panel or on its staff. The commission would have subpoena powers and would report its findings simultaneously to the President, Congress, and the public. (Leonard David, “Lawmaker Calls for Independent Space Accident Investigations,” Space.com, 16 June 2003, http://www.space. com/missionlaunches/sts107_gordon_030616.html (accessed 19 December 2008).
The CAIB held its final public hearing, moving its focus beyond the cause of the disaster to a probe of the overall state of NASA's management. Witnesses identified several key weaknesses in NASA's management of its personnel, which could have affected safety issues in the Space Shuttle Program. Allen Li of GAO, which had issued a report in 2001 about NASA workforce issues, noted that NASA had faced substantial challenges in attracting and retaining a highly skilled workforce. Therefore, key areas of NASA's programs had an insufficient number of qualified workers, and the remainder of the staff showed signs of overwork and fatigue. In response to the 2001 report, NASA had developed new systems for monitoring such issues, and Li said that NASA had made noteworthy progress. However, NASA was still requesting congressional approval of personnel reforms that would help ameliorate the situation, reforms that would give NASA the authority to streamline the hiring process and the ability to offer larger recruitment and retention bonuses. Marcia S. Smith of the Congressional Research Service provided the CAIB with a history of NASA's budget situation but remarked that the CAIB would have difficulty tying budgetary changes directly to safety issues and Shuttle operations. Russell D. Turner, the former CEO of the prime contractor for Shuttle operations, United Space Alliance, defended the work of the firms involved in the Space Shuttle Program. (Tom Shoop, “NASA Needs Management Overhaul, Shuttle Investigators Told,” Government Executive, 13 June 2003.
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