Aug 26 2003
From The Space Library
NASA announced that it had awarded a follow-on contract to the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to continue providing scientific and operational support for the Chandra X-ray Observatory. The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory had provided scientific and operational support since Chandra's launch in July 1999. The follow-on contract, valued at US$373 million, funded support through 31 July 2010. NASA had planned Chandra's mission to last five years from the time of its launch, but had extended the mission to 10 years because of Chandra's success. (NASA, “NASA Awards Chandra X-ray Observatory Follow-on Contract,” contract release c03-z, 26 August 2003, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/aug/HQ_C03z_Chandra_Contrct.html (accessed 29 December 2008).
Harold W. Gehman Jr. delivered the CAIB's final report to NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe, presenting its findings and recommendations. The CAIB found that a 1.7-pound (0.77-kilogram) piece of foam insulation, traveling at more than 500 miles (804.6 kilometers) per hour, had damaged Columbia's wing during launch, ultimately leading to its disintegration during reentry. The report stated that management decisions during Columbia's flight reflected missed opportunities, ineffective communication channels, flawed analysis, and ineffective leadership. When cameras tracking Columbia provided two grainy images showing the foam striking the wing, engineers had immediately begun to discuss obtaining further images of the Shuttle or initiating a spacewalk to check for damages. However, mission managers had “adjourned for a holiday weekend and did not discuss the foam strike.” Upon returning to work on 21 January, the managers had assessed the strike as a postlanding maintenance problem, because smaller foam strikes had left harmless dents in Shuttles during all previous missions. The CAIB's Executive Director John L. Barry remarked that, among NASA's competing goals of maintaining costs and meeting schedules, safety had lost out. The Board directly criticized Administrator Sean O’Keefe for increasing pressure to meet a February 2004 launch deadline, thereby creating a pattern similar to that which had led to the Challenger disaster in 1986. The CAIB recommended that NASA implement 15 actions before the next Shuttle flight, including creating an independent safety-and-engineering organization to help establish satisfactory safety margins. Upon receiving the Board's final report, O'Keefe reiterated NASA's intention to comply fully with the recommendations. (NASA, “NASA Administrator Accepts Columbia Accident Report,” news release 03-276, 26 August 2003, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/aug/HQ_03276_AOK_Acpt_CAIB.html (accessed 29 December 2008); Mark Carreau, “Columbia Accident Board Casts Wide Net of Blame,” Houston Chronicle, 27 August 2003; Kathy Sawyer and Eric Pianin, “Report Blames Flawed NASA Culture for Tragedy,” Washington Post, 27 August 2003.
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