Nov 3 1963
From The Space Library
Cosmonauts Capt. Valentina V. Tereshkova and Maj. Andrian G. Nikolayev were married in a civil ceremony in Moscow, followed by an emotional four-hour reception for 300 guests. Premier Nikita Khrushchev acted as toastmaster at the reception, and relatives and friends were crowded into the background by Soviet dignitaries. A crowd of 1,000 stood outside the state wedding palace prior to the marriage and watched guests arrive. Moscow Radio announced the ceremony 90 min. after it had taken place and interrupted its program frequently for recorded bulletins from the reception. Fellow cosmonauts were in attendance and signed the marriage register as witnesses. (Shabad, NYT, 11/4/63, 1)
U.S.S.R. was designing a supersonic transport aircraft from the start, not modifying a bomber design as they had done with the TU-104 and were rumored to be doing again, according to FAA Deputy Administrator Gordon Bain. (NYT, 11/4/63, 1)
ComSatCorp was planning its initial offering of stock in the spring of 1964, probably on the order of $200 million. Half of this stock would by law have to be made available to the general public at no more than $100 per share, the remaining half being taken by the communications industry. Wall Street predicted that the stock would meet with unprecedented enthusiasm for a large issue by a new and speculative corporation. Meanwhile the ComSatCorp technical staff was still studying the technical and economic factors involved in establishing a global communications net "at the earliest practicable date" that Congress directed. The goal was for an operating satellite system by 1966-67 employing either medium-altitude or synchronous-orbit satellites. (NYT 11/3/63, 1F)
A roundup of world press opinion on the manned lunar landing race, following Premier Khrushchev's statement of Oct. 26 that Russia was not presently planning manned lunar flight, indicated that the majority of the newspapers thought Khrushchev had made a sensible decision which the U.S. ought to follow. (NYT, 11/3/63, 9E)
U.S.S.R.'s maneuverable spacecraft POLET I, launched Nov. 1, 1963, was put through its maneuvers by radio commands from the ground, according to K. Gilzin, writing in the Soviet armed forces newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda: "Our new maneuverable spaceship, heeding radio commands from earth, obediently turned first to one side, then to the other, soared up and dived, changing its position in space." (NYT, 11/4/63)
Editorial in the Washington Sunday Star commented on U.S.S.R.'s latest space feat, the launching of the maneuverable spacecraft POLET I: "Russia's newest venture in space has come at exactly the right time. Although not so intended, it pulls the rug from under those among us-such as economizing Congressmen and excessively zealous scientists like Linus Pauling-who have been clamoring for an end to our country's program to place Americans on the moon by 1970. "These people, with much naivete (to use a polite word), have attached an extravagant degree of importance to Premier Khrushchev's recent remarks vaguely suggesting that he may be withdrawing the Soviets from the lunar race . . . . their latest space shot plainly, and disturbingly, indicates that they are well ahead of us with the kind of rendezvous capability that is essential to efforts to place men on the moon and bring them back safely . . . . "Clearly, we must run this race as swiftly as we possibly can." (CB, 11/4/63, A6869)
Reviewing the U.S. manned lunar landing program, John Finney of the New York Times concluded that the race to the moon had always been a one-sided one, that there was no evidence that the Russians were building the large rocket that would be necessary for such a venture, that they were rather proceeding on a building-block program in space that eventually would lead to a lunar landing, but not as a special, high-priority project. This, Finney said, was also the approach of the U.S. until May 1961. "Then, in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the first Soviet manned space flight, the Kennedy Administration ordered an abrupt change in course." The original justification was that U.S. prestige was at stake. As time went on and budget resistance developed in Congress, the Administration argument shifted to one of attaining "a position of preeminence" in space. Also the potential military benefits were emphasized more and more. Finally, the President's proposal for the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. manned lunar program seemed to undercut all preceding positions. To Mr. Finney, all this added up to the certainty that the U.S. would continue its program for a manned lunar landing "but it will be pursued with less competitive zeal and at a more leisurely pace." (Finney, NYT, 11/3/63, 5E)
Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, interviewed on NBC-TV, said he was surprised in May 1960 when the U.S.S.R. publicized the downing of the U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Russia. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also "believed just as I did that it was necessary to use it but he also believed that it would cause no real publicity if one of them should fall." Both of them felt that the Soviets would not be willing to concede publicly that for "three or four years we've been doing this . . . ." On the question of admitting U.S. responsibility for the flights, Mr. Eisenhower said: " . . . I just thought as the thing had come out, the best thing to do-and I don't believe I asked anyone's advice on this-I just said am responsible and that's that." (Wash. Post, 11/4/63)
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