Mar 19 1966
From The Space Library
Statement from MSC on GEMINI VIII mission said that “a short in the circuits controlling a spacecraft yaw thrustor has been pinned down. as the probable cause of the difficulty which cut short the flight of GEMINI VIII.” MSC Director Dr. Robert R. Gilruth said data ruled out any possibility of pilot error and that “in fact, the crew demonstrated remarkable piloting skill in overcoming this serious problem and bringing the spacecraft to a safe landing.” NASA Associate Director for Manned Space Flight Dr. George E. Mueller, who had participated in review of data, joined Dr. Gilruth in saluting Astronauts Armstrong and Scott and commended the evaluation team for “coming up with the answer” in less than 72 hrs. following the incident. “This will give us time to study the GEMINI IX configuration and make any adjustments necessary in order to press forward with our Gemini flight test program.” 16-mm. color films taken by an automatic camera mounted on Armstrong’s window in the GEMINI VIII were made public by NASA. Films showed maneuvers of GEMINI VIII in docking with GATV and gyrations of the spacecraft after the malfunction. ‘‘(Text, NYT, 3/21/66, 19; AP, Balt. Sun, 3/21/66)’’
Astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and David R. Scott arrived at KSC to begin an intensive three-day conference with Gemini project officials to attempt to reconstruct events leading to their loss of control of the GEMINI VIII spacecraft March 16. Scott told a crowd at the airstrip that “the lift off, launching, rendezvous, and docking were really tremendous. We were really looking forward to the whole mission.” Armstrong agreed, adding: ‘?We had a magnificent flight in the first seven hours. It was a magnificent launch-without a doubt one of the best there’s ever been.” ‘‘(AP, NYT, 3/20/66, 82)’’
Rep. John W. Wydler (R-N.Y.) said in a speech before the American Society of Tool & Manufacturing Engineers in Westbury, N.Y.: “Two years ago I asked Administrator Webb for NASA’s future space plans and was told that none existed. I pointed out then that such plans were essential. Last year, we received assurance that the presentations of the fiscal year 1967 budget would reveal such plans. But none has been issued. Instead, NASA Administrator Webb has told us ‘the future of the NASA program lies largely in the decision for fiscal year 1968.’ . . . Our space program began in an atmosphere of perplexity and fear. Our adversaries in Russia had chosen a new arena for the struggle of international power and prestige. They threatened to achieve impressive capabilities which we would be unable to match. But, characteristically, the United States rose to the occasion in one of the biggest sustained technological efforts ever seen. Today, the U.S.S.R. is denied many of the options for surprising space spectaculars which they once had. From month to month, one country or the other may seem to be leading the so-called space race, but our proven capability shows that we are not to be placed at any military or strategic disadvantage. Therefore it is time again for public opinion to assert itself. What do we want to do with this hard won space capability?” ‘‘(Text)’’
USAF successfully launched Nike-Javelin combination carrying a payload of plume measurement instrumentation seconds after launch of its target-an Atlas-D ICBM-from Vandenberg AFB. Launch was first in High Altitude Background and Signal to Noise (Hitab) program in which data on infrared radiation and emission characteristics associated with missile exhaust plumes and other exhaust products were telemetered back to Vandenberg telemetry station. ‘‘(UPI, Chic. Trib., 3/20/66, 22; UPI, NYT, 3/19/66, 82; UPI, Chic. Trib., 3/25/66)’’
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