Apr 9 1967
From The Space Library
Most probable cause of Jan. 27 flash fire in which Astronauts Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White II, and Roger B. Chaffee died was a sparking short circuit in worn, defective, or poorly insulated wire, Apollo 204 Review Board concluded in its final report. Copies of report were distributed simultaneously to NASA Administrator James E. Webb, congressional committees, and the press. Board was unable to pinpoint exact ignition source, but identified conditions which led to the disaster : (1) a sealed cabin, pressurized with an oxygen atmosphere; (2) an extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin; (3) vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power; (4) inadequate provisions for the crew to escape; and (5) inadequate provisions for rescue or medical assistance. Having identified these conditions, the Board addressed itself to the question of "how these conditions came to exist. Careful consideration of this question . . . leads . . . to the conclusion that in its devotion to the many difficult problems of space travel, the Apollo team failed to give adequate attention to certain mundane but equally vital questions of crew safety. "The board's investigation revealed many deficiencies in design and engineering, manufacture and quality control. When these deficiencies are corrected the over-all reliability of the Apollo program will be increased greatly." Board offered a total of 21 recommendations, including: (1) an "in-depth" review of the entire Apollo life-support system; (2) an investigation of effective ways to control and extinguish spacecraft fires; (3) severe restriction and control of amount and location of combustible materials inside spacecraft; (4) reduction of time required for crew to egress and simplification of escape operations; (5) continuous monitoring of safety of all test operations to assure adequacy of emergency protections; (6) improved ground communications system; (7) continued studies of two-gas cabin atmosphere; and (8 ) full-scale mockup tests to establish fire safety of reconfigured Command Module. Board emphasized that its report was not intended as a criticism of NASA's entire manned program: "The board is very concerned that its description of the defects in the Apollo program . . .will be interpreted as an indictment of the entire manned space flight program and a castigation of the many people associated with the program. Nothing is further from the board's mind." (Text, NYT, 4/10/67, 1, 28-9; W Star, 4/ 10/67, A1, A6-7; W Post, 4/10/67, AI, A8)
William H. Woodward was promoted from Deputy Director to Director of OART's Space Power and Electric Propulsion Div.-formerly Nuclear Systems and Space Power Div.-succeeding Harold B. Finger, who became NASA Associate Administrator for Organization and Management March 15. Woodward would be responsible for planning, managing, and coordinating advanced research and technology programs in the area of space power, including solar, chemical, nuclear, and electric propulsion. (NASA Release 67-78)
NASA office-Downey at North American Aviation's Downey, Calif., plant was disestablished and its functions transferred to MSC and MSFC, (NN 1136)
Completed section of USN's $80-million radio communications center at Northwest Cape, Australia, was occupied by Navy personnel under Capt. Robert Friedman. Center, which would maintain contact with US. nuclear submarines in Pacific and Indian Oceans via very-low-frequency radio, would be fully operational in July. (Durdin, NYT, 4/9/67, 3)
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