Dec 24 1975
From The Space Library
The National Research Council, in its program of conducting technical studies on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, had mailed out announcements to more than 5000 individuals and organizations inviting statements on the role of nuclear power in the context of alternative energy systems. Hearings in five major cities had been scheduled for January and early February 1976 to obtain the broadest possible perspective for a comprehensive study. The Energy Research and Development Administration had asked the academies to conduct a 2-yr study, and the announcement represented the first time in the 112-yr history of the National Academy of Sciences that such an extensive effort had been made to solicit the views of the informed public on a projected study. The committee conducting the study would attempt to set forth the current and probable states of energy technology through the year 2010, various policy options, and consequences of each. (NRC Release 24 Dec 75)
The Air Force had awarded a $28.5-million contract to Lockheed Aircraft Corp. for design, development, and testing of a strengthened wing for the C -5A transport airplane that the New York Times called a symbol of Pentagon "cost overruns." Aim of the original C -5A contract with Lockheed had been to produce a transport capable of carrying a 99 700-kg payload and having a service life of 30 000 flying hours. Even before it had gone into full operational use, the C -5A wing had been shown in static ground tests to be too weak to carry the prescribed load and had developed fatigue cracks in the metal structure. The cracking had been attributed to high stress levels inherent in the design, ineffective fasteners on the wing panels, and difficulty in mating the stiff contours of the wing and joints during manufacture. The Air Force had paid $4.5 billion on delivery of 81 C-5As; it had already spent more than $198 million through June 1975 correcting deficiencies for which Lockheed was responsible under the original contract, renegotiated when Lockheed was in financial difficulty in 1971. In addition to $1.3 billion for fixing the wings, the AF planned to spend another $200 million to fix other defects. Cost of the repairs would nearly double the original AF estimate of $3.4 billion for the C -5A program. However, without the repairs, the C-5A fleet would have to be grounded beginning in 1979 when the flying-time safety limit had been reached. Because of the defects, service life had recently been re-estimated at 8750 hr and payload limit at 78 900 kg. (NYT, 15 Dec 75, 1; WSJ, 24 Dec 75, 3)
Citing "new scientific evidence" supporting ozone-depletion theories, the Natural Resources Defense Council and 10 states had petitioned the Consumer Product Safety Commission to ban the use of fluorocarbon propellants in aerosol products. The commission had denied a previous petition from the resources council; the Food and Drug Administration-which had responsibility for regulating all food, drug, and cosmetic aerosol products-had also rejected a petition from the group. Copetitioners with the resources council were the Environmental Defense Fund and the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group; the 10 states were Colo., Fla., Mass., Mich., Minn., N.H., N.Y., Ore., Vt., and Wis. Both N.Y. and Ore. had already passed laws banning the use of fluorocarbon sprays, and more than a dozen other states were said to be considering this action. The Aerosol Education Bureau-sponsored by industry to oppose a ban of fluorocarbon-containing products issued a statement that restrictions would be "inappropriate." (WSJ, 24 Dec 75, 5)
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