Apr 11 1967
From The Space Library
Apollo 204 Review Board, accompanied by NASA Administrator James E. Webb, testified before Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Key Board members summarized the Board's findings and recommendations. Astronaut Frank Borman, asked if he believed U.S. decision to use 100% oxygen atmosphere in spacecraft had been influenced by a desire to achieve first manned lunar landing, replied: ". . . never since I have been associated with NASA have I ever experienced any decision where a known detriment to crew safety was sacrificed to any operational requirement. And although I am willing to accept risk . . . I am not willing personally to accept undue risk and I would not participate in any decision which I thought was expediting a program in an unsafe manner. And in the final analysis the crew is the Review Board because if we do not like the way the spacecraft is configured, we don't have to get in." Borman said if on Jan. 27 he had had the information accumulated by the Board, he would not have entered the Apollo spacecraft because: (1) the test had not been classified as hazardous; (2) the spacecraft contained too many combustibles; (3) the wire that provided the ignition source was vulnerable. Borman said he would be "willing and eager" to enter a 100% oxygen Apollo spacecraft which incorporated Board's recommended improvements. (Testimony; Transcript, 181,209-10,258)
In testimony before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics' Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, North American Aviation President J. Leland Atwood denied that pressures to meet 1970 lunar-landing goal had prompted NAA engineers to take shortcuts in Apollo program. Terming the Apollo 204 Review Board's study "a good and penetrating report," Atwood conceded that deficiencies existed in the Apollo capsule, but disputed Board's charge that "deficiencies existed in Command Module design, workmanship, and quality control. . . ." NAA's Director of Research and Engineering Dr. John F. McCarthy said that although an electrical arc "probably" caused the fire, there were "various other possibilities"--such as Astronaut Gus Grissom accidentally kicking loose a wire that could have later initiated the blaze. Under stern questioning by subcommittee members, however, Dr. McCarthy admitted that this theory was pure speculation. In response to charge by Rep. William F. Ryan (D-N.Y.) that prevailing attitude prior to fire was not "just a feeling of over-confidence" but "real negligence" by NAA and NASA, Atwood reasserted that the most serious error made by NAA and NASA was classification of the AS-204 test as "non-hazardous." Questioned about the reasoning behind designing to minimize fire hazard, Dr. McCarthy pointed out that NAA had concentrated on eliminating possible ignition sources while it turned out that the amount and placement of flammable materials was crucial. He characterized this as a "grave error in judgment." Atwood assured the Subcommittee that NAA and NASA had "placed great stress" on the importance of quality and workmanship: "The procedures followed and the depth of inspection which have been employed far surpass those . . . used on any other program. The fact of the accident itself makes it obvious that we must do more than we have done, that we must-guided by the finding of the board-redouble our efforts to approach perfection. Already we have gone over every other design feature of the spacecraft to identify any other area of possible failures . . . [and] we have found none." (NYT, 4/12/67,34; W Star, 4/12/67, A6)
New York Times commented on Apollo 204 Review Board`s final report on Jan. 27 flash fire: "Two months ago, on the basis of the incomplete evidence then available, we suggested that the Apollo catastrophe had taken place because `many men miscalculated-grossly .' The official report . . . suggests that that conclusion was too kind . . . [since] the report convicts those in charge of Project Apollo of incompetence and negligence. "The core of the problem is indicated in the board's fifth finding: `Those organizations responsible for the planning, conduct and safety of this test failed to identify it as being hazardous. Contingency preparations to permit escape or rescue of the crew from an internal Command Module fire were not made.' "How could those in charge of the test have `failed to identify it as being hazardous?' The three astronauts had been put into what even a high school chemistry student would know was a potential oxygen incendiary bomb, one needing only a spark to initiate catastrophe. . . . But at Cape Kennedy, in the report's words, `No procedures for this type of emergency had been established either for the crew or for the spacecraft pad work team.' "The incredible complacency thus revealed overshadows even the other disgraceful and disheartening findings of the review board. . . . And as the record of incompetence and careless work-devastating in its impact-is recited in the report, one wonders how many of the previous manned space flights succeeded rather than how the Apollo tragedy occurred. . . ." (NYT, 4/11/67,44M)
Lunar Orbiter III, launched Feb. 4, had sent full photographic coverage of six primary Apollo sites west of 20° east longitude and partial coverage, including high-resolution photographs, of six remaining sites in east. One objective had been to photograph a landed Surveyor with sufficient resolution to detect the spacecraft. NASA-appointed study group established location of image on Lunar Orbiter photographs that fitted all SURVEYOR I identification criteria. (NASA Proj Off)
NASA Nike-Cajun sounding rocket launched from Wallops Station carried GSFC-instrumented grenade payload to 78-mi (126-km) altitude to obtain data on temperature, pressure, density, and wind between 22-59 mi (35-95 km) at transition from winter-time westerly to summer-time easterly circulation. Rocket was planned as companion shot with Nike-Cajun launched from Point Barrow, Alaska, April 10. Weather conditions at Wallops Station prevented launch on same day. Rocket and instrumentation performed satisfactorily. (NASA Rpt SRL)
FAA proposed that current noise abatement rules covering large aircraft be applied also to small turbine-powered aircraft. Many turbine-powered aircraft were not included under the large transport category, but created a higher noise level than piston-type aircraft of comparable size. (FAA Release 67-36)
Washington Daily News' editorial warned that U.S. eagerness to sign space law treaty-under consideration in Senate since Feb. 7-might be costly: "Since the risks of Soviet deception are so great, it seems unwise to have accepted the Russian-proposed no-inspection honor system. . . . Since there is no provision for a check on space activity, the Soviet Union could push ahead with a variety of secret military programs in space while publicly attacking the right of the U.S. to an American military defense program in space. . . . Since the U.S. is an open society, any U.S. space defense program would be known. Since the Soviet society is closed, Moscow might well be able to keep its programs secret. "The loose way in which this space treaty was written was due in part to the Administration's eagerness to get a treaty in hand. But that looseness could lead the U.S. into a trap." (Cromley, W News, 4/11/67, 12)
April 11-13: Witnesses testifying before Senate Commerce Committee expressed conflicting views on proposed Corporation for Public Television. Ford Foundation consultant Fred W. Friendly said he would oppose any long-range design that relied on Treasury Dept. appropriations to produce news and public affairs programming because such funds would be subject to annual review by Congress. Instead, he suggested, news and public affairs should be underwritten from private funds-preferably out of savings from a non-profit comsat system that would employ income from commercial programs to help meet educational television's overhead. Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., chairman of Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, urged revision of the proposed legislation so that the Corporation would have continuing responsibility for program selection to ensure freedom "from the centralization and rigidity of a network system" and to protect autonomy of local stations. NET President John R. White argued that the Corporation's role should be limited to matters of "high policy" and that operational activities, including the choice of programs to be carried on a network, should be subcontracted to other entities. The Corporation, he said, would not be able to make informed decisions until the programs had been submitted for national distribution. (Gould, NYT, 4/12/67, 79; 4/13/67, 75; 4/14/67,67)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
