Apr 9 1986
From The Space Library
NASA's Task Force on the Scientific Uses of the Space Station, established in March 1984 and chaired by Stanford University Professor Peter M. Banks, released its second major report for planning the scientific utility of the Space Station. The report pointed out that space-based scientific progress had been slower than planned because of short time in orbit, rigid time lines, long periods between flights, and that the Space Station had the obvious potential of overcoming these difficulties, The two major conclusions reached noted that Space Station facilities must be operated with the goal of producing outstanding scientific results; and that the station would be judged with respect to cost and research capability and the need for well-equipped, permanently habitable laboratories able to support a broad range of fundamental research in space.
The task force recommended that the Space Station emulate the adaptive science methodology used in terrestrial laboratories, introduce "telescience" (the ability to conduct research remotely), review safety standards to achieve a reasonable state of personal and system security, work with a crew size of 10, and develop "space mail" for delivering small samples of materials to ground laboratories. Other recommendations: (1) Attached payloads are an important part of the core Space Station, and NASA needs a more productive plan for converting observation experiments developed for Spacelab to Space Station; (2) free-flying platforms are essential for conducting many important scientific endeavors for the Space Station era (i.e., several platforms operating in different orbits); (3) NASA should enhance biological research activities in the pre-initial orbit configuration period using Spacelabs and other attached payloads on the Space Shuttle to gain experience for conducting biological science research programs; (4) development of a human-tended mode of scientific activity aboard a Space Station would be of little value and a need exists for a truly long-term, human capability; (5) it is essential that NASA look ahead to the activities that are anticipated over the 25-30 year life span of the core facility and its associated elements; (6) the Space Station will facilitate development of a new type of research termed "science in space"; (7) the science operations of the Space Station should be separated from the operational management of the overall facilities; and (8) NASA must be prepared to change many of its nationally oriented selection, funding, and management procedures because of the important hardware and scientific contributions that will be made by international partners. (Written Statement to the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, Committee on Science and Technology from Peter M. Banks, Apr 9/90; NASA Release 86-43)
Evidence revealed the Challenger crew cabin did not explode with the mid-air accident, but remained intact until it struck the water. The cabin, said engineers, was seven times stronger than other parts of the Shuttle because it had to maintain an Earth-like atmosphere while in space. All seven astronauts, however, were probably killed instantly by shock from the initial blast, sudden depressurization of the cabin, or the tumbling nine-mile descent. (W Post, Apr 10/86; NY Times, Apr 10/86; W Times, Apr 10/86; CSM, Apr 10/86; USA Today, Apr 10/86; C Trib, Apr 10/86)
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