Jan 2 1978
From The Space Library
Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine reported that President Carter would soon receive from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown a plan for a unified U.S. space policy covering all government and private-sector programs. The plan was the product of a policy review committee headed by Brown and consisting of representatives from NASA, the Dept. of Agriculture, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, DOD, the office of the President's national security adviser, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Interior Dept. and NOAA had participated in a steering committee under the main group. After evaluating the effect of the U.S. space program on foreign policy, national security, and overall economic benefit, the group had agreed that national security considerations were the main hindrances to formulating a national space policy. The group had considered space-arms control (maximum pacification of space, with limitations on killer satellites); availability of reconnaissance-satellite data (greater federal agency access); regulation of private-sector remote sensing (resolution limits); interagency management (a coordinating committee, to be chaired either by DOD and NASA, or by the President's science adviser); broadcast satellite policy (no restrictions on signals crossing national borders); and certain intelligence, DOD, NASA, NOAA, and civilian programs. (AV Wk, Jan 2/78, 14)
AV Wk reported NASA's announcement that it would send Pioneer 11 to fly just outside the rings of Saturn as a pathfinder for two Voyager spacecraft scheduled to reach Saturn in 1980 and 1981. Passing 15 000mi rather than 3700mi from Saturn's surface, the new course would place Pioneer 11 at about the same distance from Saturn as the trajectory of Voyager 2, if NASA should decide to use Saturn's gravity to hurl Voyager 2 toward Uranus. The outside trajectory would permit NASA to achieve the maximum science return for all three spacecraft. Pioneer 11 should reach Saturn in Sept. 1978. (AV Wk, Jan 2/78, 15; Lewis News, Jan 6/78, 2)
President Carter's $100 million reduction in MX-missile FY 1979 funding would not prevent DOD's continuing advance MX development for another yr, AV Wk reported. The remaining $160 million would cover costs of assessing basing modes and alternatives for the missile. The President's decision to continue MX without starting engineering development would delay initial operational capability until 1987. Key administration officials doubted that MX would ever be deployed, said Av Wk, because of its links to future SALT agreements preventing deployment of mobile-based systems. (Av Wk, Jan 2/78, 13)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
