Apr 7 2003
From The Space Library
The CAIB questioned NASA flight managers and tank engineers about damage from launch debris~a key concern of the CAIB~during 4 hours of technical testimony at a public hearing. The CAIB sought to uncover why NASA officials had considered the recurrent problem of foam falling during launches a maintenance issue rather than a flight safety concern. NASA testimony included the description of the layers of checks, justifications, and paperwork required to certify a Shuttle for launch, as well as evidence of NASA engineers' collective conviction that the shedding foam did not present a threat to flight safety and, therefore, was not a sufficient reason to cancel a launch. In October 2002, foam falling from the bipod area of its external tank~ the area where two metal struts connect the fuel reservoir to the orbiter~ had struck Space Shuttle Atlantis. The foam that had fallen from Space Shuttle Columbia striking its wing had come from the same area of Columbia's external tank as the foam that had struck Atlantis. However, engineers and managers had examined Atlantis's debris incident and had determined that falling foam did not present a safety-of-flight concern for Columbia. Nevertheless, because of the Atlantis incident, managers had requested that engineers responsible for the Shuttle's external tank develop a plan to prevent debris from breaking away from the bipod area of the tank. Engineers had not completed the plan at the time of Columbia's flight. (Todd Halvorson, “Engineers: Launch Debris Troublesome Since Start,” Florida Today (Brevard, FL), 8 April 2003; Marcia Dunn for Associated Press, “Earlier Shuttle Flight Had Foam Problem,” 8 April 2003.
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