Aug 30 1999
From The Space Library
Lockheed Martin cleared its Atlas II rocket to resume the 1999 launch schedule, after having placed its schedule on hold when a Delta III launch failed in early May. Delta's RL10B-2, upper-stage engine was similar to the RL10A-4 used on Atlas's Centaur upper stage. The Boeing Company and Pratt & Whitney had led the investigation of the Delta III launch failure, with the support of Lockheed Martin. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin Astronautics had formed two panels "to ensure that no aspects of commonality between the RL10 engine versions were overlooked." The Senior Engineering Review Panel and the Senior Management Review Team had addressed potential causes of launch failure identified in the Delta III investigation, ruling out those factors that did not apply to Atlas Flights. When the investigators had determined that "an engine-brazing process that left voids in combustion chamber structural jacket splice joints" was common to all RL10 engines, Lockheed Martin had instituted a new set of inspection and analysis measures for accepting or rejecting each engine. Lockheed Martin intended to use the inspection techniques on new production chambers; Pratt & Whitney planned to continue using its standard procedure, with its Flight Certification Board certifying each set of RL10 engines for all Atlas missions.
GAO published a report, "Space Station: Russian Commitment and Cost Control Problems," reiterating its previous recommendation to NASA to plan for a scenario in which Russia was unable to fulfill its commitments to the ISS. Although the report recognized that NASA was in the process of drafting such a plan, GAO's sole recommendation to NASA was to ensure the contingency plan's completion before the launch of the Russian-built Service Module.
The Independent Assessment Team on Mission Success, which Lockheed Martin had commissioned in May 1999 after a series of Titan IV launch failures, met its 1 September deadline, reporting its findings and recommendations to Lockheed's senior management. Lockheed Martin had tasked the investigating team with assessing program management, engineering and manufacturing processes, and quality-control procedures within the company's Space and Strategic Missiles Sector. Having discovered problems in accountability, quality, subcontract and supplier management, and cost emphasis, the Team recommended that the company develop a "fly-out plan" for Titan IV's remaining missions, improve its quality control, and improve its management of suppliers and subcontractors. Chairperson of the review panel A. Thomas Young remarked that regardless of the problems the team had uncovered, the panel had also found "enormous fundamental technical strengths" throughout the sector, as well as "highly capable and dedicated" staff. Young also commented that the new leadership team was "off to a positive start." Vance D. Coffman, Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer for Lockheed Martin, "endorsed the panel's findings and pledged Lockheed Martin to implementing its recommendations."
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