Jan 26 1967
From The Space Library
NASA successfully launched Essa IV, fourth meteorological satellite in ESSA'S Tiros Operational Satellite (TOS) system, from WTR using three-stage Thor-Delta booster. Satellite achieved nearly-polar, sun-synchronous orbit with 888-mi (1,429-km) apogee; 822-mi (1,323-km) perigee; 113-min period; and 102" inclination. Wheel orientation maneuver was scheduled for completion during 18th orbit, at which time first photos would be programed and two-week spacecraft checkout and evaluation program would begin. An advanced version of the cartwheel configuration, 290-lb Essa IV carried two Automatic Picture Transmission (APT) camera systems which would photograph earth`s cloud cover and immediately transmit pictures to local APT ground stations. Essa IV was replacing Essa II in the TOS system because orbital drift limited Essa IV's usefulness. ESSA financed, managed, and operated TOS system; GSFC was responsible for procurement, launch, and initial checkout of spacecraft in orbit. Essa I was launched Feb. 3,1966; Essa II , Feb. 28, 1966; and Essa III , Oct. 2, 1966. (NASA Proj Off; ESSA Release 67-17)
Messages from President Johnson and Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato were exchanged between Washington, D.C., and Tokyo in ceremony inaugurating commercial service via ComSatCorp's Intelsat II-B comsat. In President Johnson's message, delivered by Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.), he said: "The beginning of Pacific satellite service tonight is more than a great technical feat: It is a promise of deeper understanding between the peoples of East and West. . . ." Ceremony also included live color television exchanges and telephone, teletype, facsimile, and photograph transmissions between the two capital cities. Intelsat II-B was launched by NASA from ETR Jan. 11. (ComSatCorp Release)
Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, presented most detailed statement to date on the program. He said plans were to form an "embryonic space station" in 1968-69 by clustering four AA payloads launched with Uprated Saturn I boosters. First mission would be launch of manned spacecraft, followed several days later by launch of spent S-IVB stage converted into a workshop. After two spacecraft had docked, crew would enter workshop through an airlock. They would prepare workshop for storage and return to earth in their spacecraft 28 days later. In three to six months, second manned capsule would be launched on 56-day mission to deliver resupply module to workshop and rendezvous with unmanned Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) , fourth and last launch in series. Cluster would be joined with multiple docking launched on S-IVB workshop. Emphasizing the importance of manning the ATM, Dr. Mueller said: ". . . if there is one thing the scientific community is agreed on it is that when you want to have a major telescope instrument in space it needs to be manned. "First of all you need him to point it. Second, you need him to be able to change the films and so on. Thirdly, you need him to maintain it so when something goes wrong he can fix it instead of having to sit here on the ground and be frustrated by the fact that some little gadget didn't quite trip when it should have. . . ." Dr. Mueller said principal areas toward which $454.7 million FY 1968 post-Apollo effort would be directed were "development of extended flight capability, the conduct of manned astronomical and Earth observations from space, and continued exploration of the Moon." (Transcript; Marshall Star, 2/1/67,7-8; Clark, NYT, 1/30/67,2; Reistrup, W Post, 1/27/67, A7)
In his annual "defense posture" statement to the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara made a determined attempt both to persuade Congress not to insist on a U.S. antimissile defense and to dissuade the U.S.S.R. from continuing her efforts to deploy such a system. McNamara said U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles were so effective that neither country could hope to protect itself against the other in time of war, and an increase in defensive capability by one power could easily be offset by an increase in the offensive capability of the other. A major policy statement by Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky published in Kommunist had stressed strategic offensive missiles, without referring to U.S.-U.S.S.R.'s burgeoning antimissile defense system. (Frykland, Gwertzman, W Star, 1/26/67, D3)
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