Jun 13 2006
From The Space Library
The House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics held a hearing to assess whether NASA’s current workforce strategy was developing the tools needed to meet NASA’s future needs. Subcommittee Ranking Member Mark Udall (D-CO) expressed concern that the proposed budget reductions to its aeronautics, microgravity life and physical sciences, and space and Earth sciences programs would further complicate NASA’s efforts to create a workforce with an appropriate balance of civil servants and private contractors. NASA’s Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management Toni Dawsey testified that the overall objective of NASA’s workforce strategy, submitted to Congress in April 2006, was “to transform the composition of NASA’s workforce so that it remained viable for the long-term goals of NASA’s missions.” She stated that NASA was addressing its two most pressing workforce challenges— “uncovered capacity, caused by program changes and cancellations and budget constraints, and retaining Space Shuttle employees through its retirement in 2010.” NASA was maintaining sufficient work in house to protect and strengthen its core capabilities and had established a Shuttle Human Capital Working Group to oversee the complex Shuttle workforce issues. David C. Black, cochair of the NRC committee that NASA had asked to explore “long-range science and technology workforce needs to achieve the Nation’s long-term space exploration vision,” also testified. In its interim report, the committee planned to recommend that NASA work with other government agencies involved in space-related work, as well as with the private sector, including universities, to “assess the nature, scope, and possible solutions for its skill mix.”
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, The NASA Workforce: Does NASA Have the Right Strategy and Policies To Retain and Build the Workforce It Will Need? 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 13 June 2006, 14, 17, 81, 84, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?browsePath=109%2FHOUSE%2FCommittee+on+Science&granuleId=CHRG-109hhrg27971&packageId=CHRG- 109hhrg27971&fromBrowse=true (accessed 21 December 2010); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science, “What Will NASA’s Future Workforce Look Like?” news release, 13 June 2006, http://science.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1140 (accessed 4 February 2010).
NASA’s Genesis Mission Mishap Investigation Board, chaired by Michael Ryschkewitsch of NASA’s GSFC, released its findings on why the drogue parachute and parafoil systems had failed to deploy properly, to slow the Genesis Sample Return Capsule’s re-entry. With nothing to slow its descent, the capsule had crashed into Utah’s desert landing zone on 8 September 2004. The fifth in its series of Discovery missions, NASA had launched Genesis on 8 August 2001, to collect samples of solar wind and to return them to Earth. The Board had determined that the proximate cause of the mishap was an erroneous design, namely, the installation of the G-switch (gravity-switch) sensors in an inverted position, rendering them “unable to sense sample return capsule deceleration during atmospheric entry and [to] initiate parachute deployments.” The report identified root causes of the accident, as well as major contributing factors. It cited JPL project managers’ lack of critical oversight during Lockheed Martin Space Systems’ design, review, and testing of the spacecraft. The report also found that NASA’s systems engineering processes were inadequate and recommended “adding a thorough review of all project Systems Engineering progress, plans, and processes as part of existing major milestone reviews.” Furthermore, the Board criticized NASA’s decision to use its “faster, better, cheaper” approach to select and develop the Genesis mission, an approach that NASA had previously applied in other failed missions. The Board found that this approach had impaired JPL’s insight into the project’s technical progress and increased the element of risk.
AMir Alexander, “Genesis Mishap Investigation Board Releases Final Report,” The Planetary Society, 13 June 2006, http://www.planetary.org/news/2006/0613_Genesis_Mishap_Investigation_Board.html (accessed 22 February 2010) 14 June 2006; NASA, “Genesis Mishap Investigation Board Report,” (Washington, DC, June 2006), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/149414main_Genesis_MIB.pdf (accessed 22 February 2010); NASA, “NASA Releases Genesis Accident Report,” media advisory M06-097, 13 June 2006, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/jun/HQ_M06097_Genesis_update.html (accessed 22 February 2010).
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