Jun 15 1970
From The Space Library
Apollo 13 Review Board accident report was released by NASA at Hq. news conference. LaRC Director Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman of Review Board, said accident "was not the result of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense but, rather, it was the result of an unusual combination of mistakes coupled with a somewhat deficient and unforgiving design." After assembly and acceptance testing, oxygen tank No. 2 that flew on Apollo 13 had been shipped from Beech Aircraft Corp. to NR in apparently satisfactory condition. "It is now known, however, that the" tank contained two protective thermostatic switches on the heater assembly which were inadequate and would subsequently fail during ground test operations. . . In addition, it is probable that the tank contained a loosely fitting fill tube assembly. . .which was loose when it left the plant. . .[and] was subsequently displaced during handling. . .[and] led to the use of improvised de tanking procedures. . which almost certainly set the stage for the accident." Special detanking procedures at KSC subjected tank to extended heater operation. "These procedures had not been used before and the tank had not been qualified by test for the conditions experienced. However the procedures did not violate the specifications which governed the operation of the heaters. . . . In reviewing these procedures before the flight, officials. . .did not recognize the possibility of damage due to overheating. "The thermostatic switch discrepancy was not detected. Nor did tests identify the incompatibility of the switches with the ground support equipment at KSC. . . As shown by subsequent tests, failure of the thermostatic switches probably permitted the temperature of the heater tube assembly to reach as much as 1000 degrees Fahrenheit [810 K] in spots during the continuous eight hour period of heater operation. From that time on the oxygen tank. . .was in a hazardous condition when filled with oxygen and electrically powered. "However it was not until nearly 56 hours into the mission that the fan motor wiring possibly moved by the fan stirring of the fluid contents of the tank short circuited and ignited the wiring insulation by means of an electric arc. The resulting combustion in the oxygen tank probably overheated and failed the wiring conduit where it enters the tank and possibly a portion of the tank itself. The rapid expulsion of high pressure oxygen which followed possibly augmented by combustion of insulation in the space surrounding the tank blew off the outer panel. . .of the service module, caused a leak in the high pressure system of Oxygen Tank Number 1, damaged the high gain antenna, caused other miscellaneous damage and aborted the mission." Board recommended that cryogenic oxygen storage system be modified to minimize use of combustible materials and remove materials that might short-circuit from contact with potential ignition sources and that system be rigorously requalified; onboard warning systems be reviewed and modified; consumables and emergency equipment be reviewed to determine whether potential for use in "lifeboat" mode should be enhanced; MSC continue special tests and analyses under way to understand better the accident details; standard procedures require "presentation of all prior anomalies" whenever significant anomalies occurred in critical subsystems during final preparations for launch; NASA thoroughly reexamine all spacecraft, launch vehicles, and ground systems to identify and evaluate potential combustion hazards and conduct additional research on materials compatibility, ignition, and combustion in strong oxidizers at various g levels; and MSC reassess all Apollo spacecraft subsystems and engineering organizations responsible for them to ensure adequate understanding of subsystems at subcontractor and vendor level. Cortright said thermostatic switch discrepancy and incompatibility of switches with KSC ground support equipment was "a serious oversight in which all parties [NASA, NR, and Beech] shared. . . . The accident is judged to have been nearly catastrophic. Only outstanding performance on the part of the crew, Mission Control and other members of the team which supported the operations successfully returned the crew to earth." (Transcript; text)
U.S.S.R.'s Soyuz IX (launched June 2) set new manned flight endurance record at 6:35 pm Baikonur time, when it surpassed 13-day 8hr 35-min record set by NASA's Gemini VII (Dec. 4-18, 1965). Apollo Astronauts Frank Borman and James A. Lovell, Jr., sent congratulatory telegram to Soyuz IX crew: "Your accomplishments are adding new evidence supporting the capability of men to live and work in extended periods in space. We wish you continued success in this important mission and a safe return to earth." Lovell told press in Houston that mission suggested U.S.S.R. would develop permanent earth-orbiting space station: "Soyuz now seems to be purely an aeromedical flight, pushing men to their limits to see how weightlessness and the pure oxygen environment affects their work in space. It all fits very naturally with the space station concept." (Astrachan, W Post, 6/16/70, A1; SBA 6/16/70, 211)
ITOS I (Tirol M), Improved Tiros Operational Satellite launched by NASA from WTR Jan. 23, 1970, was turned over to ESSA for operational use after five-month engineering checkout by NASA. (NASA Release 70-96)
House and Senate conferees on H.R. 16516, FY 1971 NASA authorization, reached agreement and filed conference report H. Rpt. 911189. Report recommended $3.411-billion NASA authorization containing $2.693 billion for R&D, $34.5 million for construction of facilities, and $683.3 million for research and program management, of which not more than $506.1 million would be for personnel costs. R&D total included $994.5 million for Apollo program (increase of $38 million over NASA request), $565.2 million for space-flight operations (increase of $50 million), $1.5 million for advanced missions program (decrease of $1 million), and $116 million for physics and astronomy program (as requested by NASA), restoring $5.6 million which House had deleted for Explorer satellites. Conferees approved NASA request of $167 million for Space Applications and agreed to authorize revised plan for construction of experimental Earth Resources Technology Laboratory at GSFC at $1.9 million cost. (CR, 6/15/70, H5490-3; Text)
NASA announced it would negotiate with Grumman Aerospace Corp., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., and Chrysler Corp. for 11-mo Phase A (feasibility) contracts to study Space Shuttle concepts. Boeing Co. would be major subcontractor to Grumman on $4-million contract for three shuttle concepts: stage-and-a-half shuttle of reusable manned spacecraft with onboard propulsion system and droppable tanks for supplementary propellants; reusable orbiter with expendable booster; and reusable 1st stage using existing J-2S engine technology, solid-propellant auxiliary boosters, and reusable 2nd-stage orbital shuttle with J-2 engine. Lockheed's $1-million fixed-price contract would define alternate stage-and-a-half shuttle system including high and low cross-range designs. Chrysler Corp. would study reusable vehicle capable of placing payload into earth orbit with single stage, under $750 000 contract. (NASA Release 70-97)
Dr. Eberhard F. M. Rees, MSFC Director, welcomed 59 science and engineering professors from universities and colleges in 26 states who would participate in Summer Faculty Fellowship programs sponsored by NASA and American Society for Engineering Education. Research program from June 15 to Aug. 21 would be followed by 11-wk design program, both conducted by Auburn Univ. and Univ. of Alabama. Participants would perform individual research in MSC laboratories. Work would be documented for NASA use. (MSFC Release 70-115)
Staran IV system to reduce midair collisions-by computer performing more than 40 million mathematical operations per second to predict collision courses and determine evasive maneuvers-was introduced at Washington, D.C., press conference by developer, Goodyear Aerospace Corp. System could single out aircraft on collision course and show them to air traffic controllers on viewing screen as though they were only aircraft in air. FAA was studying proposal for adoption of system. (Goodyear Aerospace Corp Release)
Intention to create separate FAA office to deal with total air transportation security problems, including aircraft hijacking, was announced by Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe. (FAA Release 70-57)
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