Mar 2 2009
From The Space Library
NASA announced the successful completion of the second drop test of a drogue parachute for the Ares-I rocket. The drop test had taken place on 28 February 2009 at the U.S. Army’s Yuma Proving Ground near Yuma, Arizona. The test was the seventh in a series of flight tests supporting the development of the Ares-I parachute-recovery system, which comprised a pilot chute, drogue, and three main parachutes. To test the 68-foot-diameter (20.7-meter-diameter) drogue parachute, researchers had dropped the parachute from a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft flying at an altitude of 25,000 feet (7.62 kilometers). The drogue had carried a 50,000-pound (22,680-kilogram, or 22.68-tonne) load, to simulate the rocket’s spent first-stage motor. The parachute and the test hardware had functioned as planned, landing the load safely. NASA engineers had designed the drogue to permit recovery of the rocket’s reusable first-stage motor. They planned to use the design in future Ares-I flights, including launches associated with NASA’s Constellation Program.
NASA, “NASA Successfully Tests Parachute for Ares Rocket,” news release 09-045, 2 March 2009, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2009/mar/HQ_09-045_Ares_Drogue_Test.html (accessed 4 May 2011).
GAO published a report finding that NASA had continued to experience cost overruns and delays in implementing large-scale projects or those budgeted at US$250 million or more. GAO had audited 18 NASA projects, with a combined life-cycle cost of more than US$50 billion. Of those 18 projects, 13 had entered the implementation phase. Ten of the 13 had experienced significant cost growth or schedule growth or both. Development costs had increased by an average of 13 percent from baseline cost estimates, and projects had an average launch delay of 11 months. GAO reported that many projects had faced challenges in developing new technologies or retrofitting older technologies, as well as difficulty managing contractors. However, GAO found that, despite these problems, NASA had improved its ability to manage and to estimate the cost of major projects. Nevertheless, GAO suggested that NASA needed to make additional improvements. The report noted that, although NASA’s budget represented less than 2 percent of the federal government’s discretionary budget, NASA was increasingly receiving requests to expand its portfolio to support important scientific missions, such as the study of climate change. GAO found that, to meet these increased demands, NASA would need to work even harder to manage its resources as effectively and efficiently as possible.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, “NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (report no. GAO-09-306SP, Washington, DC, 2 March 2009), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-306SP (accessed 11 May 2011); Mark Matthews, “GAO: NASA’s Big Projects Take Too Long, Cost Too Much,” Orlando Sentinel (FL), 3 March 2009.
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