Nov 18 2003
From The Space Library
NASA announced the new charter and new members of its Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). All members of the previous ASAP, which the U.S. Congress had initially chartered in 1967 following the Apollo 1 fire, had resigned in late September 2003 in the wake of the Columbia accident investigation. The original charter had intended the panel to act as an independent body to advise NASA's Administrator on safety issues, but over the years, additional administrative procedures had governed the panel's work. In the new charter, NASA revoked those procedures to enable the panel to develop its agenda in accordance with CAIB findings. The ASAP's original 1967 charter formed the foundation of the new charter, with the following revisions: 1) the ASAP would make quarterly reports, instead of annual; 2) new members would have two-year terms, extendable to a maximum of six years; 3) members would have staggered terms to ensure fresh perspectives at regular intervals; and 4) the ASAP would focus on industrial and systems safety, risk management, trend analysis, and management of NASA's safety and quality systems. NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe named, as new members of the ASAP, Rear Admiral Walter H. Cantrell, Vice Admiral Joseph W. Dyer, Augustine O. Esogbue, Major General Francis C. Gideon Jr., Deborah L. Grubbe, Rosemary O'Leary, John C. Marshall, Steven B. Wallace, Rick E. Williams, and ex officio member, Brigadier General Joseph A. Smith. The new members represented academic, military, and industrial sectors; no member was a current or former NASA employee or contractor. (NASA, “NASA Names New Safety Advisory Panel,” news release 03-370, 18 November 2003, http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/nov/HQ_03370_asap.html (accessed 5 February 2009); Patty Reinert, “NASA Safety Panel Takes Flight Again with New Members,” Houston Chronicle, 19 November 2003.
Federal investigators concluded that a series of avoidable mistakes had caused the fatal crash of the chartered King Air A100 carrying Senator Paul D. Wellstone (D-MN) on 25 October 2002. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the two charter pilots had possessed inferior flying skills, they had twice failed to align the twin-engine turboprop on the proper course for an instrument landing, and they had subsequently permitted the airspeed to drop to dangerously low levels. The craft had stalled and plummeted into the woods, killing all eight on board. The NTSB recommended that the FAA improve inspections of on-demand charter companies in an effort to improve pilot training and in-flight procedures. The NTSB report also recommended that the FAA and NASA create a special technical panel to study the feasibility of “low airspeed alert systems,” which would automatically warn pilots, especially those of small aircraft, of conditions that could lead to a disastrous stall. (Ricardo Alonso-Zalvidar, “Pilots Are Blamed in Wellstone Crash,” Los Angeles Times, 19 November 2003.
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