Oct 8 1965
From The Space Library
LUNA VII moon probe probably was destroyed in impact on the moon because the firing of the retrorockets was "only partially successful," speculated Sir Bernard Lovell, director of Jodrell Bank Observatory, Sir Bernard said variations in the signals heard at Jodrell Bank showed LUNA VII's retrorockets were fired at 4:58 p.m. EDT for six minutes, He estimated that LUNA VII, traveling about 2 mps. was slowed down by five-eighths of a mile a second during this firing, Signals began again at 5:20 p.m. and then stopped at 6:08 p.m.-the precise time when Russia had said LUNA VII would reach the moon. There was no official word on the fate of the ton-and-a-half space probe, but Western experts believed the Soviets had failed in their third attempt to softland on the moon; (UPI, Wash, Post, 10/9/65, A6; AP, Wash. Eve, Star, 10/8/65, A5)
Test model of the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle designed to simulated lunar landing was flown by former NASA X-15 pilot Joseph Walker to 300 ft. Built by Bell Aerosystems Co. under contract to NASA. The research craft had a jet engine that supported five-sixths of its weight; the pilot manipulated solid-fuel lift rockets that supported the remaining one sixth. The crafts attitude was controlled with jets of hydrogen peroxide. (Wash. Post, 10/9/65, A4, AP, Hous Chron.110/9/65)
NASA had asked ComSatCorp to provide communications satellite services in support of tracking and data acquisition needs for Project Apollo. The facilities-six highly-reliable telecommunications channels to be made available to three Apollo tracking ships and three remote land stations-were to be in operation by the fall of 1966. Negotiation of a definitive contract would begin shortly. (NASA Release 65-320)
NASA and Soviet Academy of Sciences representatives reached two satisfactory understandings in their New York discussions on space cooperation. The first, which reaffirmed the existing agreement for exchange of weather satellite data, provided that satellite data would be available on a continuing basis from both sides within a few months. The second, an agreement for the preparation and publication of a joint review of research in space biology and medicine, provided for joint editorial board to receive full cooperation from both sides in the preparation of materials available in the two countries, selection of author, and publication of their work. Barring an objection either side within two months, the agreement would become effective automatically. (NASA Release 65-325)
House Committee on Science and Astronautics' Subcommittee on NASA Oversight issued a report on investigation of Project Surveyor by Rep. Joseph E. Karth's (D-Minn.) Space Science and Applications Subcommittee. Karth committee summarized the most serious reasons for Surveyor's delay; 1) the failure to do adequate preliminary work; 2) a series of major modifications; 3) inadequate staffing by JPL in the first three years; 4) too rapid expansion of personnel at a later date; 5) poor management on the part of Hughes; 6) a resistance on the part of Hughes to making management changes; 7) an improperly conducted testing program by Hughes; 8) management weaknesses in NASA; and 9) a lack of vigorous centralized control by NASA. To describe the magnitude of the Surveyor problems, the Congressional investigators highlighted a NASA press release of January 1961, which outlined Project Surveyor as costing about $50 million, consisting of seven spacecraft, each weighing 2,500 lbs., capable of placing over 200 lbs, of scientific payload on the lunar surface, with launches scheduled during the 1963-66 time period. The Subcommittee then noted that the first launch had been delayed about two and a half years, payload capability had been reduced to only a TV camera on the first four spacecraft and only 114 lbs. on the next three operational models, with total costs so far of nearly $350 million for the spacecraft R&D alone. The investigation concluded that the responsibility for the Surveyor situation could be found in the inadequate preparation for the project, the performance of JPL, the performance of Hughes Aircraft, and the performance of NASA Headquarters. "A serious mistake" was made at the very beginning of the Surveyor project when insufficient preliminary work was done to identify serious technical problems, judge feasibility, consider alternatives, and more accurately estimate costs. The investigation concluded further that this was "the inevitable result of a poorly defined project." (House Rpt.)
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark were planning to establish a Nordic chain of detector stations to register underground atomic blasts, Sweden and Norway would each construct at least one detector station and join their stations; Denmark would build a large station in Greenland. Swedish experts believed that the new U.S. detector station in Montana together with the Nordic chain would make detections 100 per cent certain. (Fleisher, Wash. Post, 10/9/65, A18)
Until man can duplicate responsibility-society's basic ingredient-in test tubes and mathematical equations, he should not attempt to duplicate himself in a laboratory, asserted Dr. Johannes M. Burgers, Speaking at the Symposium on Fluid Dynamics and Plasma, Burgers recommended a 50-yr, moratorium of artificial-life experiments because "our society is not ready for it." Too many groups would take it out of the hands of science and make unholy use of it... Wait until the educational level of man is higher. Wait until you know more about life." (Homan, Wash, Post, 10/8/65, B10)
U.S. would make the first lunar landing because the "Saturn V booster ... is the only one anywhere powerful enough to do that," predicted NASA Administrator James E. Webb, speaking to the International Radio and Television Society in New York. He believed the U.S. was ahead of Russia in cumulative knowledge of manned spaceflight, but conceded that Russia was probably 18 mo. ahead in other areas-specifically, multimanned spacecraft and the building and use of big boosters, Webb refused to classify Russia's LUNA VII mission as unsuccessful, explaining: "They're practicing how to do these things. They must have gained a good deal of information from it." (San Diego Union, 10/10/65)
$12 million, 210-ft,-dia. antenna at JPL's Goldstone Tracking Station, Calif., was being readied to permit the tracking of very distant space vehicles sending faint signals to earth, including MARINER IV, now in solar orbit. Called the Mars station, the antenna would be able to track a signal with a strength of only one-thousandth of one-billionth of one watt. ( Wash, Post, 10/8/65, A3)
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